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Summary 
Human behavior is influenced by numerous different determinants. Behavioral research has tried to 
track down these influences and identify the factors that drive behavior in different situations. Starting 
with the homo oeconomicus, research has come up with multiple models explaining human behavior. 
Because the neoclassical view that human beings are utility maximizing economic agents was met 
with increasing critique over the last decade, new models were developed. With novel research 
techniques a vast amount of evidence contradicting the homo oeconomicus was generated. Those 
techniques included empirical as well as experimental data and forced researchers to update and 
extend the old models to fit reality. In consequence models such as the satisficer
1
, the homo 
reciprocans
2
, or the homo heuristicus
3
 have emerged. Deviations from utility maximization can be 
explained by "satisficing"  behavior which does not aim to achieve the absolute best outcome but 
rather a sufficient one, where costs and benefits find a satisfying balance. Another observation is that 
reciprocity determines behavior as well. Experiments have shown how participants were willing to 
forego money in order to return a favor to others (positive reciprocity) or to take revenge (negative 
reciprocity). Research also identified that humans deviate from rational behavior because they often 
rely on simple rules of thumb (heuristics) as guidance for everyday behavior. 
Additional to these explanations of human behavior, another strand of research has looked at 
individual decisions and how these are embedded in a succession of decisions. This research states that 
one decision may have repercussions on a subsequent decision and therefore may influences future 
behavior. When one decision follows another, especially inconsistencies are puzzling: how can it be 
explained that a person first states to not be sexist, but afterwards engages in sexist behavior? How is 
it possible that someone who describes himself as charitable refuses to give money to a charity only 
minutes later? Such inconsistencies can be explained by moral self-regulation. 
This thesis is situated in this field of research. In study 1 an introduction to the research on moral self-
regulation is provided alongside with an explanation of the two manifestations of moral self-
regulation: moral licensing and moral cleansing. At the core of the first study is an experiment which 
was designed to identify moral licensing and cleansing in the domain of honesty. The experiment 
merges relevant studies from social psychology and experimental economics. It assesses the question 
if moral self-regulation exists within the domain of honesty  or more precisely, if the truth and lies 
are told in such a way as to balance each other out. After manipulating participants’ moral balances 
(either positively or negatively), rates of truth-telling are compared to a neutral baseline scenario. 
Since neither moral licensing nor moral cleansing is observed, the results provide no support to the 
initial hypothesis that moral self-regulation exists within the domain of honesty. 
Study 2 builds on these results and discusses possible reasons for the absence of moral self-regulation. 
The research on moral hypocrisy and self-concept maintenance are presented and discussed as 
possible explanations. In order to shed more light on participants’ behavior, a coding procedure is 
presented that was used on the dataset from study 1. This approach makes it possible to quantify 
participants’ handwritten stories that resulted from the moral manipulation in study 1 and gain more 
insights on how truth-telling and lying affect the moral balance. By analyzing (dis)honesty on a more 
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detailed level, results show that participants tend to act consistent to what they revealed about 
themselves in their stories.  
Study 3 links together aspects of moral self-regulation, moral hypocrisy and impression management. 
The "looting game" is presented which lets participants loot money from a charity box being subject to 
altruistic punishment from observers. For their punishment decision observers are provided with a 
history of participants’ past actions. This design allows to assess how misconduct, punishment and the 
creation of a favorable impression interact and ultimately impact profits. The results indicate that 
moral cleansing  and not the desire to trick observers  is the reason for manipulation. Participants 
who loot money from the charity box do not expect to receive less punishment, rather they simply 
want to present a more favorable picture of themselves. On the other hand, observers fully account for 
the possibility of manipulation and tend to disregard a manipulated history. The looting game 
therefore brings the hypothesis into question that impressions are managed and manipulated to 
increase profits.  
This thesis adds to the current research by identifying a domain where moral self-regulation fails 
(study 1), offering explanations for this observation and identifying consistent behavior with regard to 
truth-telling and lying (study 2). Finally, it presents a novel experimental design which challenges 
profit-maximization as a motive for impression management and offers moral cleansing as an 
alternative explanation for such behavior (study 3). 
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Abstract 
To find evidence for the existence of moral licensing or moral cleansing in 
the domain of truth-telling and lying I constructed an experiment that brings 
together moral self-regulation and Gneezy's (2005) deception game. 
Participants’ moral balances were manipulated by two tasks that either 
increased or decreased moral credentials as well as moral credits. Afterwards 
participants engaged in a deception game. With this approach I quantify how 
changes in the moral balance affect truth-telling and lying. Compared to a 
baseline treatment where credentials and credits remained unchanged, I find 
no significant differences in truth-telling and lying. These experimental 
results suggest that same domain moral self-regulation does not exists within 
the domain of honesty. 
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1. Introduction 
Do people compensate good actions with bad ones and vice versa in order to balance their morality? 
This question plays an important role in human interactions and in the scientific quest to analyze and 
understand human behavior. For example for members of the Catholic Church the Sacrament of 
Penance, commonly known as confession, is a well known and wide spread way of absolving ones 
mortal sins. The penitent tells his sins to a priest and is subsequently granted absolution. Of course 
such behavior roots in the religious belief that not absolving mortal sins will condemn a person to hell. 
Nevertheless, it is an example of moral balancing behavior that seeks to compensate bad actions with 
good ones. This need exists for environmentalism as well. There are many websites that offer to offset 
a person’s carbon dioxide emissions by donating money to a charity4. These sites let you easily 
calculate the amount of greenhouse gas emitted by a flight or a car drive and display the required 
donation to offset this exact amount. Here, environmentally bad behavior can be balanced with just a 
few clicks and the payment of the calculated fee. These examples show the need of human beings to 
equalize good and bad actions through balancing behavior. In social psychology such behavior is 
called moral self-regulation. Research on this topic (e.g. Monin and Miller 2001; Khan and Dhar 
2005; Effron et al. 2009; Sachdeva et al. 2009; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Merritt et al. 2010) has 
produced many new insights on human behavior during the last decade. Various experiments gathered 
evidence on how and where moral self-regulation is at work. These have shown that moral self-
regulation works through two main mechanisms: moral licensing (feeling free to act bad) and moral 
cleansing (feeling the need to do something good). The religious act of confession would be an 
example of moral cleansing: a person is cleansed of his previously bad behavior. Donating to a charity 
on the other hand can subsequently lead to moral licensing: by giving money, a person has done 
something good and in turn feels less or no discomfort if he engages in behavior that is otherwise 
considered wrong. These mechanisms have been proven to exist in many different domains such as 
political incorrectness (Monin and Miller 2001), selfishness (Sachdeva et al. 2009) or dieting 
(Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Yet, little research has been carried out on moral licensing and cleansing in 
the domain of honesty so far. This paper aims at filling this gap and seeks to enrich our understanding 
of moral self-regulation. This article discusses if the forces of moral self-regulation work for truth-
telling and lying as well and asks the two main questions: (1) Does past honest behavior endow people 
with a positive self-worth in such a way that they subsequently feel free to lie (moral licensing)? (2) 
Do people feel the need to cleanse themselves of their lies by telling the truth more often (moral 
cleansing)? 
This paper is structured as follows: an overview of the relevant literature is provided in section 2. The 
experimental design is presented in section 3 and the hypotheses in section 4. I present the main results 
in section 5 and additional results in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Research on the dynamics of moral self-regulation describes two ways in which licensing can occur. 
One model is called moral credentials, the other moral credits. In short, the first can be thought of 
colorful glasses one puts on to make things look different. This model argues that previously 
conducted good acts cast a different light on subsequent bad acts that would on their own be 
considered a moral transgression. Moral credentials are acquired by prefacing a dubious action with 
evidence that moderates this same action. An example is if one tells a racist joke but states upfront that 
his best friend belongs to the race that he is making fun of (Zhong et al. 2009, p. 83). The second 
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model resembles the idea of a bank account for moral currency. The moral credits model states that 
doing something good adds currency to one’s moral balance while doing something bad deducts from 
the balance. Unlike moral credentials, moral credits do not change the way a transgression is assessed. 
When transgressing, one is fully aware of this fact but still feels free to do so because of his positive 
moral balance. A typical example of moral credits is the practice of purchasing the carbon offsets 
mentioned earlier. By purchasing carbon offsets a person tries to compensate for an environmentally 
harmful activity, e.g. taking a transcontinental flight (Miller and Effron 2010, p. 125). Both models 
and the related literature are shortly discussed in the subsequent two sections.
5
 
Moral Credentials 
The idea of moral credentials was established by Monin and Miller (2001). They performed an 
experiment where in a first step participants were asked to indicate if they agree or disagree to blatant 
sexist statements about women (e.g. "Most women are not really smart.") and in a second step had to 
take a hypothetical hiring decision. There, participants had to decide if they would hire a man or a 
woman for a job in the building industry that was described as being obviously best suited for a man. 
The initial statements were formulated with the purpose to result in a high rate of disagreement. A 
second treatment, where the word "most" was substituted by "some" (e.g. "Some women are not really 
smart."), resulted in significantly less disagreement among participants. By dividing participants into 
two groups with two different rates of disagreement about politically incorrect statements it was 
possible to show that the first group had acquired moral credentials by demonstrating that they are not 
sexist (Monin and Miller 2001, p. 35). These credentials were visible because the first group preferred 
a man in the hiring decision, while the second group did not as they feared appearing sexist by such a 
decision. By disagreeing to the blatant sexist statements the first group had prefaced the subsequent 
task with evidence of being a non-sexist person and thus felt free to engage in a decision that could 
look sexist on its own. Identical results were acquired when the experiment was repeated in a racism 
version (Monin and Miller 2001, study 2). Having established credentials as non-racist individuals, 
participants favored a White person over an African-American one. 
Effron et al. (2009) do support these results with a similar experiment, showing that endorsing US-
President Obama made people more willing to choose a white job applicant over a black one and thus 
potentially show political incorrect behavior. Again, this is an example of moral credentials at work. 
Showing support for Obama provides participants with the credentials as a non-racist person. This 
frees them to later take a hiring decision in a hypothetical situation which favors a White over a Black 
candidate and could appear racist on its own. 
Moral Credits 
Other research states that licensing takes place because of behavior that aims at balancing good with 
bad actions. Labels for such behavior are moral balancing (Nisan 1991), moral self-regulation 
(Sachdeva et al. 2009) or compensatory moral action (Jordan et al. 2011). Good deeds are assumed to 
generate some sort of currency (cp. Hollander 1958) that may later be spent to engage in bad deeds 
with impunity. Instead of changing the meaning of a transgression (what moral credentials do) the 
moral credits model assumes that participants are fully aware of their transgression but nevertheless 
engage in it as they have sufficient moral currency to afford such behavior. 
For example, Sachdeva et al. (2009) ran an experiment to identify balancing behavior due to moral 
credits. Participants had to write stories about themselves with certain positive (e.g. caring, generous, 
fair) or negative (e.g. selfish, mean, greedy) trait words. Afterwards they decided how much to give to 
a charity. Results indicate that when in the positive trait word treatment, participants decreased their 
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giving to a charity significantly. A self-relevant story filled with positive words licensed participants 
to behave selfishly afterwards. These participants were reminded of all their good behavior and thus 
their positive moral balance. This made them realize that they had accumulated moral credits in the 
past and provided them with a reason to abstain from donating money. Sachdeva et al. (2009) 
demonstrate evidence for moral cleansing as well. After having written a story about oneself with 
negative trait words, charitable giving increased compared to a control treatment with neutral words. 
This shows that participants felt the need to do something good (by donating money) after being 
reminded of their lack of moral credits. 
Jordan et al. (2011) used a similar experimental approach. Participants were asked to recall "a time 
when they helped other people" (moral condition) or "used others to get something they wanted" 
(immoral condition). In a subsequent math task participants had to solve 15 math problems that 
consisted of adding or subtracting ten two-digit numbers each. Here, it was possible to cheat by design 
of the experiment. If participants did not press the space bar within the first 3.5 seconds of each math 
problem an answer appeared on the screen that varied +/-1 from the correct one. This made it possible 
to identify participants who did not hit the space bar in time and let the answer appear on screen, as 
well as participants who furthermore used this wrong answer. Not only did participants in the moral 
condition allow the answer to appear more often on screen, they furthermore used it significantly more 
often than in the immoral condition. This shows how participants increase cheating after being 
reminded about their positive balance of moral credits. 
Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) provide further evidence for moral licensing and cleansing. In their 
experiment participants played 16 dictator games in sequence. Their results show that a consistent 
pattern of moral self-regulation emerges: participants equalize their donations systematically around 
their mean donation. A round with a higher donation is subsequently balanced with a lower donation. 
Since in every round players are matched with a new partner, this behavior cannot be explained by the 
desire to compensate the receiver but is entirely due to the balancing of the moral self. 
Licensing effects emerge in other domains as well, for example in consumer choice, as Khan and Dhar 
(2005) show. Within their experiment, participants were asked to imagine and furthermore give 
hypothetical reasons for having done one of two community services that were described in detail. 
This simple task made participants appear charitable and boosted their moral self-worth. In a second 
task they were more likely to choose a luxury item over a necessity item than the control group. 
In my experiment I extend the research on moral self-regulation to the domain of honesty. There is no 
conclusive evidence for licensing and cleansing in this special domain yet. Evidence exists that lying 
can be licensed with good deeds in different domains, for example with green consumer behavior 
(Mazar and Zhong 2010). In this study participants had to fill a virtual shopping basket as they liked 
with items of up to $25 in value. One group did this shopping in a conventional store, the other group 
in a store with green products. Afterwards participants performed a visual perception task where they 
had to watch a box with a diagonal line on the screen. For 1 second dots would show up that were 
scattered within this box and participants should indicate if more dots were on the left or on the right 
of the diagonal line. The dots were scattered in such a way that it was easy to identify the correct 
answer. The critical manipulation in this task was that participants were paid 0.5¢ if they indicated 
there were more dots on the left but 5¢ if they indicated there were more on the right. In 40% of the 90 
trials more dots were indeed on the right side. While participants that shopped in the conventional 
store identified 42.5% of the trials having more dots on the right and did not significantly differ from 
the correct value, participants that shopped in the green store identified 51.4% of the trials as having 
more dots on the right side. These participants were intentionally lying to earn more money. In this 
9 
experiment lying was licensed by a good deed in a different domain (shopping in a green store). I try 
to explore if lying can be licensed by truth-telling and therefore within the same domain. 
3. Experimental Design and Treatments 
Parallel to similar experiments on licensing and cleansing I designed the experiment in two parts. Part 
1 provides the mechanisms necessary to manipulate participants’ moral balances, whereas in part 2 
honesty as the dependent variable is established. In this experiment participants’ moral balances are 
increased in treatment truth and decreased in treatment lie. The baseline treatment provides a neutral 
setup with no changes to moral balances against which the changes in treatment truth and lie are 
tested. In part 2 participants played a deception game (Gneezy 2005) in which they had to either tell 
the truth or tell a lie. This setup allows to assess how changes in moral balances affect honesty. 
The central idea I employ to set up this experiment is to combine ideas from different directions of 
research. I bring together the experimental setup from Monin and Miller (2001) and Sachdeva et al. 
(2009) with Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. The experimental design from the first two studies is 
borrowed in order to implement a mechanism that changes participants’ moral balances. But I 
substitute the second part, which is usually a hypothetical scenario in social-psychological research, 
with a deception game (Gneezy 2005). This setup allows me to observe actual behavior rather than 
stated preferences for certain outcomes and to implement a licensing and cleansing mechanism into a 
behavioral experiment with controlled conditions in a laboratory environment. 
Part 1 - Manipulation of moral credentials and moral credits 
So far the literature on moral self-regulation provides no evidence if licensing or cleansing works via 
moral credentials or moral credits in the domain of honesty. Demonstrating honest behavior could 
provide the credentials for subsequent dishonesty. A lie may then be interpreted in a more favorable 
way if it was prefaced by honest behavior. Similar to the results on sexism and racism (Monin and 
Miller, 2001), participants may feel free to lie after having expressed their preference for honesty in 
general. On the other hand, licensing and cleansing could work through the balancing of moral credits. 
Honesty could build up moral credits that would later be spent on dishonest behavior and vice versa. 
Since no clear evidence exists which mechanism is at work, I decided to implement both mechanisms 
and manipulate participants’ moral credentials as well as their credits. Much evidence exists on the 
fact that people are averse to lying and even abstain from lying if it results in a pareto-superior 
situation (Gneezy 2005; Lundquist et al. 2009; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Maggian and Villeval 2014). I 
hypothesize that in order to license lying a strong mechanism is required to generate a license. To 
create such a mechanism I developed one task that manipulated credentials and one task that 
manipulated credits. Participants in the experiment performed both tasks in sequence so that their 
credentials and their credits were manipulated at the same time. With this approach I want to identify 
if licensing (and possibly cleansing) exists at all rather than determining the individual mechanism that 
is at work. If this procedure does not produce a license for lying, this would provide strong evidence 
against same-domain licensing. 
Manipulation of Moral Credentials 
Following the manipulation of credentials that Monin and Miller (2001) implemented, all first-movers 
(the senders in the following deception game) were presented with five statements (see Appendix A1 
for the exact wording of each statement) and asked to state their agreement to each statement. Monin 
and Miller (2001) constructed treatments by the use of different keywords ("some" vs. "most")
6
. 
Disagreement to sexist statements such as "Some/Most women are better off at home taking care of 
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the children" (Monin and Miller 2001, p. 35) is easier to voice if statements are framed in a blatant 
sexist way using the word "most". By their disagreement participants acquired moral credentials of 
being not sexist. This in turn led them voice sexist behavior more easily afterwards as they were 
licensed to do so. In my experiment I used that general idea as well, but the wording was slightly 
different. The statements took the form of advice that one person gives to another. Five statements 
were constructed in such a way that for five different areas of life (family, politics, academia, 
journalism and business) a superior gives advice to a subordinate person suggesting to utilize 
dishonesty for personal gain. Furthermore, the statements in treatment truth were framed as strong as 
possible and therefore as easy to disagree to as possible by substituting the keyword "most" with 
"all"
7
. The critical manipulation in treatment lie was to insert the word "sometimes" in all sentences. 
This made the advice more ambiguous and is expected to lead to less disagreement as sometimes 
dishonesty might be a reasonable decision. This in turn means that less moral credentials are acquired. 
In the baseline treatment statements from the same five areas as above were employed but the content 
had no connection to honesty. Here, it was necessary to give participants a neutral task that would 
leave their moral credentials unaltered. At the same time this task should not be too easy so 
participants would not get bored and in turn experience negative emotions towards the experimental 
procedures which would bias the results. Furthermore, agreement and disagreement was required to 
balance out over all, so no bias was introduced by an overall stronger focus on positive or negative 
answers. According to these prerequisites I constructed five statements (see Appendix A1) covering 
five topics that were relevant in the news at the time the experiment took place. Participants were 
expected to have a personal opinion either in favor or against each of the given statements. In all 
treatments participants were asked to state their agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from "I 
completely agree" (1) to "I completely disagree" (5).
8
 
Manipulation of Moral Credits 
After providing participants with credentials for honesty, I went on to manipulate their moral credits in 
task 2. Sachdeva et al. (2009) require participants to write a self-relevant story with positive, negative 
or neutral trait words in order to change their moral self-worth. I build upon this idea and gave first-
movers (senders) the following task: In treatment truth, participants were asked to write about a real or 
fictional situation, where it was difficult for them to tell the truth. In treatment lie, participants were 
asked to write about a situation in which they lied. In baseline participants had to describe a situation 
where they discussed any of the topics from task 1 (see Appendix A2 for the exact wording). 
Participants used pen and paper to work on this task in handwriting. I asked them to not write more 
than five sentences or bullet points and finish this task within five minutes.  
A situation in which one behaved honestly, especially if it was hard to do so, would provide 
individuals with evidence of being an honest and upright person, thereby increasing their moral 
credits. By adding "although this was difficult for you" I forced participants to think about situations 
where honesty was not an easy option to choose. In doing so, I tried to rule out answers that did in fact 
reflect honest behavior but without any moral costs. Possible examples are all instances where 
someone tells honest facts, like the current time or daily routines. Reporting such facts of course 
qualifies as honest behavior, but it does not increase a moral balance because critically no moral 
credits are acquired by such behavior. I conjecture that in order to obtain a moral license it is not only 
important to tell the truth, but also that some difficulty was involved in doing this. Therefore, 
participants were asked to describe a situation that involved some obstacle. 
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In treatment lie participants’ moral credits are expected to decrease, as describing a situation where 
one told a lie would force participants to visualize and think about an immoral situation. Telling lies is 
generally considered immoral behavior and as such participants would be reminded of their negative 
moral balance. In baseline no change of the moral balance is expected, as participants described a 
neutral situation without any connection to moral topics. A discussion about family, politics or 
business should neither increase nor decrease moral credits. Using this approach, experimental 
procedures are identical over all treatments and make comparisons between treatments possible.   
Scrambling Task for Second-Movers 
Since I was interested in how changes in the moral self-worth changed first-movers’ (senders’) 
behavior, I tried to avoid any effects that would arise out of believes formed by first-movers on how 
second-movers (the receiver in the following deception game) might act. To avoid these effects (of 
first or higher order) every first-mover was informed that only he would deal with task 1 and 2. 
Furthermore, I explicitly informed first-movers about the fact that their matched partners would do an 
unrelated word-scrambling task in the meantime and that they were completely ignorant to either the 
statements (task 1) or the self-relevant story (task 2). Since first-movers needed some time to complete 
tasks 1 and 2 I devised a word-scrambling task for second-movers to keep them occupied for the same 
amount of time. For this scrambling task I used an idea from Khan and Dhar (2005, p. 11 and 
Appendix) and adapted the content to fit the experiment. All second-movers in all treatments used pen 
and paper to unscramble seven sentences in handwriting. The sentences used neutral words (see 
Appendix A3 for the exact wording) and had no connection to truth-telling or lying. 
Part 2 - The Deception Game 
The second part of the experiment contained the dependent variable of the experiment. Here, senders 
(first-movers) were to decide if they would tell the truth or lie. In order to measure the amount of 
truth-telling and lying, I closely follow Gneezy’s (2005) setup. Participants played the same cheap talk 
sender-receiver game Gneezy (2005) used. In this game the sender alone holds the information about 
payoffs that result out of two possible options, while only the receiver (second-mover) decides what 
option gets implemented. To link information and decision, the sender communicates a true or a false 
message to the receiver. This message is cheap-talk because there is no way to verify it. This makes it 
possible to measure senders’ honesty by analyzing the messages sent. 
I chose to replicate relative payoffs from treatment 3 in Gneezy’s (2005) game (see Table 1), since his 
results show a relative high number of liars (52%) for this treatment. This constitutes a nearly equal 
split of the population and provides a good starting point for my experiment, since deviations in both 
directions are possible. Table 1 shows the payoffs to sender and receiver that resulted out of the two 
possible options. Following the two tasks from part 1, all senders were presented with the following 
payoff matrix
9
: 
 Option A Option B 
Sender 2€ 6€ 
Receiver 6€ 2€ 
Table 1: Payoffs for sender and receiver in all treatments 
After having received this information senders were asked to send one of two possible messages to the 
receiver: 
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Message 1: "Option A will earn you more money than Option B" 
Message 2: "Option B will earn you more money than Option A" 
Comparing the message sent to the payoff matrix makes it possible to identify if a sender was sending 
the truth or a lie.
10
 After receiving the message from the sender, the receiver had to decide which 
option he would like to implement. This option would determine the final payoffs for both players. 
The receiver was informed about the two possible messages but received no information about 
absolute or relative payoffs. 
While the receiver considered his decision, the sender was asked to state his beliefs about this 
decision. I asked the simple question "What do you think: Which option will player 2 pick?", which 
was inspired by Sutter (2007). This lets me extract believes about the receiver’s actions. After 
answering this question, the sender was told which option the receiver had actually decided to 
implement and what payoff would result out of this decision. 
4. Experimental Hypotheses 
I set up this experiment to test if moral licensing and moral cleansing influence behavior in the domain 
of honesty. More exactly, I ask if on the one hand lying can be licensed within the same domain 
(treatment truth) and on the other hand if participants feel the need to cleanse themselves of their 
dishonesty by telling the truth (treatment lie). To compare behavior, I constructed a baseline treatment 
with the exact same experimental procedures but without any connection to moral topics or 
specifically (dis)honesty. Participants’ moral credentials as well as credits were manipulated which 
allows me to assess the fundamental question of the existence of same-domain moral self-regulation 
rather than to individually assess which mechanism is the reason for such behavior. I set up two 
hypotheses as follows: 
H1 (moral licensing): In treatment truth significantly more lying is observed compared to the 
baseline treatment. 
H2 (moral cleansing): In treatment lie significantly more truth-telling is observed compared to 
the baseline treatment. 
According to past research on moral licensing and cleansing I expect to observe significantly more 
lying in treatment truth compared to the baseline and significantly more honesty in treatment lie 
compared to baseline. In treatment truth licensed individuals are expected to lie more, while 
individuals in treatment 2 would strive for cleansing and lie less. 
292 students from the University of Passau participated in the experiment. All sessions were executed 
in the experimental laboratory at the University of Passau
11
. All interactions took place anonymously 
via computer clients. Next to every computer a pen and a sheet of paper was placed and participants 
were told that they needed this material during the experiment to answer questions in writing. The 
experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The experiment took about 25 minutes to 
complete with an average payoff of 4 Euro. Data was gathered from 292 participants and resulted in 
49 sender-receiver pairs in baseline, 48 pairs in treatment truth and 49 pairs in treatment lie. Overall, 
70.3% of the participants were female and the mean age was 22.5 years. Participants were on average 
in their 4.9th semester. 
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 In this case, message 1 would be the truth and message 2 would be a lie. If nature selected the other payoff 
matrix with p=0.5, message 1 would be a lie and message 2 would be the truth. 
11
 For the recruitment of participants and providing laboratory resources I kindly thank PAULA – the Passau 
Experimental Laboratory. 
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5. Results 
Task 1 - Manipulation of Credentials 
The manipulation of the statements in task 1 worked as expected. In treatment truth and treatment lie 
the histograms in Figure 1 show a clear negative skew indicating strong disagreement overall. In the 
baseline treatment the distribution is far more symmetric without a tendency towards either agreement 
or disagreement. A two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test shows that disagreement in treatment 
truth is significantly stronger than in treatment lie (p=0.039). This indicates that the manipulation 
worked as intended. Most disagreement is observed in treatment truth (M=4.6, SD=0.41) where the 
statements suggested to use blatant dishonesty. In treatment lie less disagreement (M=4.35, SD=0.63) 
is observed as the statements were more ambiguous by the inclusion of the word "sometimes". In 
baseline (M=2.95, SD=0.50) arguments for both agreement and disagreement are equally valid and 
therefore no skewed distribution is observed. While in baseline participants’ credentials remained 
unaltered, participants in treatment truth strongly disagreed to using dishonesty and consequently have 
acquired the credentials of honest individuals. In treatment lie, disagreement was weaker and 
participants therefore have acquired no credentials for honesty.  
 
 
Figure 1: Density of means for task 1 (on the scale from (1): "I completely agree" to (5): "I completely 
disagree") 
Task 2 - Manipulation of Credits 
In task 2 participants were asked to describe a recent situation in which they either told the truth 
(treatment truth) or told a lie (treatment lie). In the baseline treatment participants were asked to 
describe a situation where they discussed any of the topics from task 1. All participants were able to 
complete this task within the given 5 minute timeframe. Nearly all participants indicated that they 
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described a real situation that happened to them recently
12
. Reading the stories revealed that 
participants wrote about truth-telling and lying in a huge variety of situations. Stories included very 
different topics concerning university, family, dating, friends or leisure activities. Table 2 provides 
some examples of the handwritten stories for each treatment. 
 Examples 
Baseline Talked with friends about the abolishment of college tuition fees. We all agreed that this is a good 
thing. 
I do not agree that the Federal Government did a good job. I discuss this topic frequently with my 
roommate after the evening news. I remember that I tried to explain to her the pros and cons of 
collective labor agreements. 
As homework for an English language course I had to write an essay about my opinion on the salary 
of a top manager from the Royal Bank of Scotland. I pondered the pros and cons and in the end 
decided that his wage is too high. Therefore I like to opt for governmental regulation. 
Treatment 
Truth 
Borrowed something and partially broke it. When returning it, I told about it and offered 
compensation, even though I could have acted as if nothing had happened. 
Truthfully told my roommate in our shared flat that she had to change her behavior or else she would 
have to move out. Confronting her in that way was not easy. 
A friend of mine bought a new dress which she totally adored. I told her that it did not look nice on 
her and knew she would be sulky for the next days. 
Treatment 
Lie 
Told my friends I was too busy to go to a party with them. In reality I was just lazy. 
I was responsible for a scratch in my mother’s car. She did not realize it at first and when she asked 
me about it two months later, I denied it. 
I told my girlfriend that I did attend a lecture even though I did not. I did not want her to nag at me. 
Table 2: Examples of participants’ answers for task 213 
These examples demonstrate that participants provided lots of different answers in task 2. This was of 
course expected as the task was formulated on purpose in an open way so participants would not feel 
constrained and perhaps would not come up with a fitting answer in time. Therefore heterogeneity was 
expected
14
. But nevertheless all stories qualified as correct answers to task 2 and no participant was 
excluded from the analysis. 
The results from both tasks indicate that the necessary manipulation of moral credentials as well as 
credits was achieved in the desired way. Next, I turn to the results from the follow-up deception game 
in order to assess how the manipulation of moral balances influenced honesty. Figure 2 shows the 
results for truth-telling and lying over all treatments. In baseline with neutral wording, I observe that 
37% of participants tell a lie. In treatment truth the rate of lying increases to 40% and in treatment lie 
lying decreases to 35%. However, the differences between treatment truth and baseline (p=0.386) as 
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 In treatment truth, 1 participant stated to describe a fictional situation; in treatment lie, 4 stories were labeled 
fictional. 
13
 Examples are translated from German and are abridged to provide illustrative examples rather than exact typed 
transcripts. 
14 
For a more detailed analysis of participants' answers see the follow-up paper, where I take a look at this 
qualitative data in more detail (Nagel 2014, working paper). 
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well as between treatment lie and baseline (p=0.583) are not statistically significant. The difference 
between treatment truth and treatment lie (p=0.309) fails to meet significance as well
15
. 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of lying (dishonest messages) 
These results indicate that neither a licensing nor a cleansing effect exists for truth-telling and lying. If 
licensed behavior existed a significant increase in lying in treatment truth should be observed. 
Cleansing behavior on the other hand should lead to significantly more truth-telling in treatment lie. 
But compared to the baseline treatment I cannot identify any differences in the two treatments. 
But Figure 2 looks only at actual messages sent and does not include players’ expectations. The 
message sent and the expectation of what the receiver will do may not always align. Senders will not 
always expect receivers to trust them and implement their messages. Therefore Sutter (2007) proposed 
to extend the definition of deception beyond the one Gneezy (2005) used. He states that in order to 
measure the true extent of deception not only those players sending a lie need to be accounted for but 
also those sending the truth because they expect the other players to distrust them
16
. Such a sender 
would engage in one additional step of reasoning because he anticipates possible distrust by the 
receiver and accounts for that by sending the truth on purpose in order to get the lie implemented. By 
applying this broader definition of deception, I observe the following rates of lying as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
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 p-values are calculated from one-tailed tests of the equality of proportions (z-test). 
16
 Sutter (2007, p. 9) uses the following definition: "Deception includes all cases where a sender sends either of 
the two messages, but expects [a lie] to be implemented by the receiver." 
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Figure 3: Frequency of lying (broader definition: sender tries to mislead receiver) 
In Figure 3 the percentages of those senders are displayed who expected the receiver to implement the 
option that is favorable for the sender (the lie), regardless of the message they sent. A sender sending a 
lie and expecting this lie to be implemented falls into that category as well as a sender who sends the 
truth but expects the receiver to not believe his truthful message. Both types of senders try to mislead 
the receiver into picking the favorable option for the sender but differ in their expectations about the 
receiver and therefore about the message they need to send in order to achieve the higher payoff. In 
baseline as well as in treatment lie I observe 59% of senders who want to mislead the receiver, 
whereas in treatment truth only 44% try to do so (one-tailed z-test, p=0.064). Using this definition, 
lying decreases significantly in treatment truth. By applying this broader definition I observe that 
participants did not act according to what licensed behavior suggests but instead even increased 
honesty. This is the opposite of what is expected from licensed behavior and runs contrary to what 
hypothesis 1 suggested. 
This observation provides additional support for the initial results. Applying the broader definition of 
deception fails to provide evidence for the existence of licensed or cleansing behavior as well. Neither 
if I look only at the message sent (Figure 2), nor if I account for senders’ expectations (Figure 3) I find 
evidence in favor of moral self-regulation of truth-telling and lying. I therefore state that within my 
experimental setup neither same-domain licensing nor cleansing exists for truth-telling and lying. The 
two main results are: 
Result 1 (licensing): Participants acquire no license for lying through honest behavior. 
Moral credentials as well as moral credits fail in providing a license for subsequent 
dishonesty. 
Result 2 (cleansing): Participants do not increase truth-telling as a consequence of having 
no moral credentials for honesty or having lost moral credits through lying. No moral 
cleansing behavior that aims at balancing dishonesty with subsequent truth-telling is 
observed. 
6. Additional Results 
Based on these two main findings I want to address some additional results in the following section, 
since the experimental setup allows for more in-depth analysis of players’ behavior. Especially, I want 
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to take another look at senders’ expectations and assess how these differ compared to receivers’ actual 
behavior. Furthermore I like to assess how expectations differ depending on message sent. Lastly, 
based on message sent and subsequent expectation I describe results on four different types of senders. 
Expected Trust and Actual Trust 
By comparing the message sent with the expectations about what the receiver will do it is possible to 
calculate how many senders expected the receiver to trust the message. Trusting a message means that 
the receiver implements the option which is suggested to be favorable for him. If a sender expects trust 
he believes that the receiver will implement the message by picking the option that is indicated to be 
more favorable for the receiver. This could either be the case if the truth is sent, resulting in the 
receiver getting the higher payoff, or if a lie was sent, resulting in the sender getting the higher payoff. 
The results show that 69% of senders expect the receiver to trust them in baseline, 58% expect their 
message to be trusted in treatment truth and 63% in treatment lie. Differences between treatments are 
not significant (one-tailed z-tests: p=0.129 and p=0.261 respectively). 
 
Figure 4: Senders’ expected and receivers’ actual trust 
Receivers’ actual trust is 69% in baseline, 79% in treatment truth and 80% in treatment lie. Again, 
treatments do not differ in the rates of actual trust. This comes as no surprise, as receivers conducted 
the exact same word scrambling task in all three treatments and were otherwise oblivious to any 
connection to honesty or morals or the fact that senders conducted different tasks. Therefore nearly 
identical rates of trust are observed in the three treatments.  
It is worthy to note that the above presented rates of expected trust are different to other research. 
Sutter (2007, p. 6) reports "that senders’ expectations match receivers’ actions remarkably well in 
aggregate". This result does not hold true here, where expected trust is significantly smaller than actual 
trust in treatment truth (p=0.013) as well as in treatment lie (p=0.037). It seems that the two tasks, 
where participants’ moral balances were manipulated with regard to truth-telling and lying, had the 
effect to make senders more doubtful about receivers’ actions. Therefore, senders’ expectations no 
longer match receivers’ actions very well. Simply thinking about the own (dis)honesty influenced 
what behavior is expected from others. 
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Trust depending on message sent 
Having established the general levels of trust between treatments, I further differentiate trust by the 
message sent. Figure 4 showed all receivers who expected trust from the receiver regardless of the 
message they sent. In Figure 5 I split these senders into two groups depending on message. In baseline 
I observe that more senders (89%) expect a dishonest message to be followed compared to a honest 
one (58%). The same pattern is visible in treatment lie where 82% expect a lie to be followed 
compared to only 53% who expect a truthful message to be followed. A different picture is visible in 
treatment truth, however. The amount of senders who expect trust after sending the truth is similar to 
the other treatments (62%) but trust after sending a lie drops considerably (53%). The difference to 
what is observed in baseline is significant (p=0.008). This means that after sending a lie significantly 
less senders expect this lie to be trusted and implemented by the receiver. Again, such behavior does 
not indicate licensed behavior. If participants had acquired a license for lying, it is to be assumed that 
they would not only behave more dishonestly (by sending lies) but furthermore expect to get away 
with their dishonesty. Here, I observe the exact opposite. Nearly half of all senders who sent a lie do 
not expect this lie to be implemented. 
 
Figure 5: Senders’ expectations of receivers trust depending on message sent 
A possible explanation for this observation could be that in treatment truth I asked participants to take 
a firm position against lying in task 1. This might have made them alert to the dangers of lying and 
lead to their conjecture that receivers will weigh messages more carefully and actively expect 
deception. Although I explicitly informed senders that receivers would not know about the tasks 
related to honesty but instead perform an unrelated word scrambling task, senders might still 
(wrongly) hold such a conjecture. Yet, a similar effect is not observed in treatment lie. This suggests a 
difference in expected trust if one thinks about honesty on the one hand and dishonesty on the other 
hand. Furthermore, if participants thought about honesty in a situation where it was difficult to do so 
(task 2), they focused on the fact that honesty is often difficult to achieve. Since the task established 
the belief that honest behavior comes with costs and proves to be difficult in many situations, 
participants could assume that receivers think exactly this way as well. Being in such a setting, a 
message that cannot be verified to be honest would instantly evoke feelings of suspicion. Being more 
alert about dangers of lying could explain the higher rates of distrust after sending a lie. This could 
lead to the increased beliefs of distrust among senders in treatment truth. In treatment lie on the other 
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hand, it seems reasonable to assume that participants wrote about situations where they successfully 
got away with a lie. One tends to remember positive and successful events more often than negative or 
unsuccessful ones. Therefore, it could be possible that participants wrote stories mainly about 
successful lies. This in turn could have lead them to belief that as they got away with a lie in the past, 
this would work in this experiment as well. These results indicate that expectations about receivers' 
actions differ depending on treatment. This means that thinking about truth leads to more distrust, 
while thinking about lies did not change beliefs compared to baseline. These results point out that an 
increase in credentials and/or credits may lead to different beliefs about others. 
Different types of senders 
Combining the dimensions "message" (truth, lie) and "expectation" (trust, no trust), Sutter (2007) 
developed four categories of players. Someone who tells the truth can be either a benevolent truth-
teller if he also expects the receiver to implement the suggested message. Or he can be a sophisticated 
truth-teller, because he sends the truth but expects the receiver to not follow his message and 
implement the opposite. For liars the same logic applies: a liar sends a lie and expects the receiver to 
follow this lie. A benevolent liar on the other hand sends a lie and believes in the receiver distrusting 
his message, ultimately resulting in the better outcome for the receiver. 
 
Figure 6: Different Types of Senders (based on message and expectation) 
In Figure 6 the percentages of players in each category are compared over treatments. I observe 
similar amounts of benevolent truth-tellers, sophisticated truth-tellers and liars for the treatments truth 
and lie (all differences compared to baseline are not significant with p>0.1). In treatment truth 
however, significantly more benevolent liars (19%) are observed compared to baseline (one-tailed z-
test, p=0.011)
17
. This means that considerably more senders chose to send a lie but distrusted the 
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 I carried out different multinomial logistic regressions with type of sender as the dependent variable 
controlling for treatment as well as gender, age and study. The results are similar to what is reported here and 
provide no new insights. 
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receiver and expected him to implement the other option instead. This corresponds to the findings 
from Figure 5 were only 53% of senders expected the receiver to trust their lie. 
7. Conclusion 
Moral licensing and cleansing are well established mechanisms for explaining human behavior. While 
such behavior could be verified in many different domains, in this paper I find no support that 
licensing and cleansing can predict behavior within the domain of honesty. In this domain, I could not 
verify the existence of either licensed or cleansing behavior. I constructed an experiment to identify if 
same-domain licensing and cleansing exist for truth-telling and lying. Previous research has proven to 
successfully license transgressions in other domains. My experiment checks for dishonest behavior 
that is licensed by honesty and honest behavior that occurs out of the need for moral cleansing. I allow 
for a broad experimental approach by including the manipulation of moral credentials as well as 
credits through two tasks that have been proven to work in similar experiments. The results on the two 
tasks indicate that these tasks were indeed successful in the requirement to provide participants with 
moral credentials and increased (decreased) moral credits in treatment truth (lie). In the subsequent 
deception game however, I do not find that this has an influence on participants’ dishonesty. I observe 
no different rates of lying than in a neutral baseline treatment. Since evidence for increased dishonesty 
due to licensed behavior or increased honesty due to moral cleansing is not found I argue that neither 
credentials nor credits are able to influence participants’ honesty. This reveals that exceptions to 
licensing and cleansing exist. While in some areas licensing seems to work very well (e.g. political 
incorrectness) in others it does not (e.g. honesty). Trying to license lying proved to fail in my setup 
and instead of inconsistent behavior after a license I rather observed consistent behavior, especially in 
treatment truth where honesty increased according to the broader definition of deception. As additional 
results I observed that participants’ expectations differed depending on treatments. I find that taking a 
firm position against lying (task 1) and writing a self-relevant story about honest behavior (task 2) 
leads participants to expect more distrust from the receivers of their message, especially after a 
dishonest message. To understand the forces that drive licensing and cleansing, future research could 
therefore explore if and how lying may be licensed by other good deeds that lie outside the realm of 
honesty and how people engage in moral cleansing for dishonesty. Furthermore an interesting question 
seems to be how moral credentials for honesty or an increase of moral credits through honest behavior 
influence subsequent trust. 
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Appendix 
A1. Task 1 (manipulation of moral credentials) 
 Original statements were in German language. 
Baseline   
1.  Instead of building daycare centers for children, families should receive direct monetary 
benefits. 
2.  It is a good thing that college tuition fees got abolished. 
3.  Overall the Federal Government did a good job in the legislative period from 2009 - 2013.  
4. Public television and radio license fees should be abolished and the content of the media should 
be left to the discretion of private suppliers.  
5.  Excessive salaries for executives should be prohibited by law.   
Treatment Truth 
1. A father tells his son: "In order to have success in life, you need to lie and deceive." 
2. A chemistry professor tells his laboratory assistant: "You need to rig your data to obtain a good 
publication." 
3. A consultant tells a politician: "You need to lie to the voters. That will get you re-elected." 
4. A chief editor tells a journalist: "You need to twist the facts for your article to sell well." 
5. A manager tells his accountant: "You need to cook the books so we will get a better economic 
performance." 
Treatment Lie 
1.  A father tells his son: "In order to have success in life, you sometimes need to lie and deceive." 
2. A chemistry professor tells his laboratory assistant: "Sometimes you need to rig your data to 
obtain a good publication." 
3. A consultant tells a politician: "Sometimes you need to lie to the voters. That will get you re-
elected." 
4. A chief editor tells a journalist: "Sometimes you need to twist the facts for your article to sell 
well." 
5. A manager tells his accountant: "Sometimes you need to cook the books so we will get a better 
economic performance." 
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A2. Task 2 (manipulation of moral credits) 
 Original statements were in German language. 
Baseline: 
"Please describe a situation that happened lately, where you discussed one of the topics from 
task 1." 
Treatment Truth 
"Please describe a situation that happened lately, where you told the truth although this was 
difficult for you." 
Treatment Lie 
"Please describe a situation that happened lately, where you told a lie." 
 
 
A3. Scrambling Task for Second-Movers (receivers) for all treatments 
 Original statements were in German language. 
1. The   University   the   river    Inn   is   located   at   of    Passau. 
2. Weekly   market   to   the   Susi   on   goes   Friday. 
3. This   is   my   not   backpack   new. 
4. The   cinema   many   movies   good   you   can   in   see. 
5. Dog   brown   has   the   hair. 
6. Birthday   party   a   Peter   on   is   Sunday   at. 
7. Child   mother   the   her   buys   ice   cream   an. 
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 Consistent Behavior in the Domain of Honesty: 
Why Moral Self-Regulation Fails 
 
 
Volker Nagel
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In a previous experimental study (Nagel 2014) no evidence for moral self-
regulation (moral licensing or moral cleansing) in the domain of honesty was 
found. In this paper, possible causes for this result are addressed and a 
coding procedure is employed to utilize data from participants’ hand-written 
stories which resulted from the original experiment. Results reveal that 
participants acted consistent to what they indicated about themselves in their 
stories. Stories that suggested an increase in moral credits were followed by 
more honesty. Stories that suggested a decrease were followed by more 
dishonesty. This supports the initial finding that licensing and cleansing fail 
in the domain of honesty and sheds light on participants’ behavior in more 
detail. The fear of appearing as a hypocrite as well as the desire to maintain 
an honest self-concept are discussed as possible reasons for such behavior.  
 
 
 
Keywords: moral self-regulation, deception, honesty, lying, moral hypocrisy, self-concept 
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1. Introduction 
Moral self-regulation has been widely researched and two main mechanisms have been proven to 
influence behavior. Firstly, moral licensing occurs when individuals engage in morally questionable 
behavior, because their previous good deeds provide them with a license to do so. Secondly, 
individuals engage in actions that figuratively cleanse them of their previous transgressions. Licensing 
and cleansing explain why people work out hard in the gym to lose weight and afterwards - seemingly 
oblivious to their effort - snack chocolate bar or why the mere contemplation about personal 
transgressions in the past increases charitable giving. Licensing and cleansing both result in 
inconsistent behavior. Snacking a chocolate bar is inconsistent to the goal of losing weight. Giving to a 
charity is inconsistent if someone describes himself as an egoistic and selfish person. Research on 
moral licensing and cleansing emphasizes that such inconsistencies occur because any single behavior 
is not an isolated observation but is embedded in a series of previous and subsequent behavioral 
choices that are all interrelated. To explain how one action influences another within this framework, 
the moral credentials (e.g. Monin and Miller 2001, Effron et al. 2009) and credits model (e.g. 
Sachdeva et al. 2009, Brañas-Garza et al. 2013) have been established. While the moral credentials 
model explains how morally ambiguous behavior gets reinterpreted in the light of previously correct 
behavior, the moral credits model explains how good and bad actions are executed in such a way as to 
balance each other out. 
In my previous study (Nagel 2014) I tried to identify if those models can explain self-regulatory 
behavior for truth-telling and lying as well. I set up an experiment to check if honesty leads to an 
increase in lying (licensing) and if dishonesty leads to an increase in truth-telling (cleansing). The 
results could not find support for either moral licensing or moral cleansing. While providing 
participants with (or without) credentials for honesty and increasing (or decreasing) their moral credits 
worked as expected, participants did not lie (or tell the truth) significantly more than compared to a 
baseline treatment. These results were robust when using the broader definition of deception, i.e. 
controlling for expectations (Sutter 2009), and revealed that honesty might even increase as a result of 
acquisition of credentials and credits (Nagel 2014, p. 12). This result runs contrary to what licensing 
predicts. These experimental findings suggest that moral self-regulation does not emerge for truth-
telling and lying and that individuals rather stick to consistent behavior. 
In this paper I want to analyze the determinants of the observed behavior in the initial experiment in 
more detail. By employing a coding procedure I am able to generate additional data from participants’ 
hand-written stories and extend the original data set with a set of new variables from this coding 
procedure. These variables reveal new insights about participants’ behavior and provide evidence why 
licensing and cleansing fails. This paper is structured as follows: in section 2 the relevant literature is 
discussed. In section 3 I shortly review the experimental design from Nagel (2014) and explain the 
coding process that is at the core of this study. Section 4 presents the results for inter-rater agreement 
and descriptive statistics from the coding procedure. Section 5 links these results to the data from the 
deception game and presents the results for consistent behavior. Section 6 discusses these results in 
light of the relevant literature and section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Research on moral self-regulation provides ample evidence on when, why and how moral licensing 
and moral cleansing appear. Monin and Miller (2001) for example identified licensed behavior for 
sexism and racism. Participants freely voiced sexists or racists attitudes if prior to that they had been 
given the opportunity to state their general anti-sexist or anti-racist attitudes. Similarly, Sachdeva et al. 
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(2009) find evidence how charitable giving increases after participants write a self-relevant story about 
their negative traits (e.g. selfish, mean, greedy) as a way to engage in moral cleansing. Other studies 
replicated results on moral licensing and cleansing (Nisan 1991, Fishbach and Dhar 2005, Khan and 
Dhar 2006, Effron et al. 2009, Zhong et al. 2009, Merritt et al. 2010, Miller and Effron 2010, Mazar 
and Zhong 2010, Jordan et al. 2011, Monin and Merritt 2012, Brañas-Garza et al. 2013) and provided 
insights into other areas where behavior can be explained by the forces of moral self-regulation. But 
Effron and Monin (2010) point out that certain criteria have to be met for moral self-regulation to 
occur. In their study they focus on the question how and when observers license transgressions. Their 
results identify certain factors that suppress licensing. For example, a school principal’s sexist 
behavior was strongly condemned when he had implemented a campaign against sexism at school 
before. If, on the other hand, that campaign was against drug-use, his behavior was excused more 
often. The transgression was identical in both studies, yet observers were willing to excuse it in one 
case but not in the other. Effron and Monin (2010) argue that hypocrisy is the reason for such 
behavior. In the first case the school principal appears as a hypocrite whereas in the second he does 
not. Observers were unwilling to excuse transgressions whenever the prior good deed made an 
individual look like a hypocrite. 
Hypocrisy has been heavily researched by Batson et. al (1997, 1999, 2003, 2006) and is commonly 
defined as saying one thing but doing another (Barden et al. 2005) or not practicing what you preach 
(Stone and Fernandez 2008). Batson et al. (1997) showed that individuals behaved in a way as to 
appear moral yet avoid the costs of actually being moral. In his landmark experiment participants had 
to decide how to assign two tasks between themselves and another person. One task was pleasurable 
and fun (with the additional chance to win raffle tickets for a $30 price), the other dull and boring. 
Participants could either assign the task directly or let a fair coin decide. But flipping the coin was not 
a binding decision. Participants would flip the coin in private and then only report the (non-verifiable) 
outcome. This introduced ambiguity into the decision process and allowed for outcomes to appear fair 
but still favor the participant himself. For example the consequences of the coin flip could be specified 
post hoc so the coin would assign the pleasurable task to the participant himself regardless of the 
outcome (e.g. "Heads, I win."; "Tails, you lose."). Or the participant could flip the coin multiple times 
if the first result was not the desired one (e.g. call a mulligan). In the experiment a significant amount 
of participants engaged in this kind of behavior: out of the 10 participants who flipped the coin, 9 
assigned the fun task to themselves. This proportion differs significantly from the expected 50% 
proportion of a fair coin. Participants therefore engaged in moral hypocrisy. They stated to have 
flipped a fair coin (i.e. appear moral) but nevertheless assigned the fun task to themselves (act 
immoral). Another study (Batson 2006) finds similar results. Participants had to divide 12 raffle tickets 
between themselves and another person. 6 of these tickets were for a high-value raffle (a $30 gift 
certificate), while 6 were for a low-value raffle (a $5 gift certificate). Moral hypocrisy arose when only 
the sender was informed about the individual values of the tickets whereas the receiver was not. In this 
case, participants wanted to appear fair by giving a nearly equal split of tickets (4.75 on average) but 
most of these tickets were of low value (3.38). The amount of tickets sent was similar to a treatment 
where neither player was informed about values (4.12). This shows how participants tried to maintain 
an appearance of fairness but simultaneously acted selfish.  
Similar results on hypocritical behavior are reported by Walkowitz et al. (2013), where participants 
acted fair as long as a scenario was hypothetical. But as soon as real money was at stake, participants 
again favored themselves. Participants liked to appear fair, yet actually acted unfair. The same is true 
for honesty, as Hao and Houser (2010) report. They find that participants cheated to the greatest 
possible degree after having established an appearance of honesty. 
28 
While experiments have proven numerous examples of hypocritical behavior, the literature points out 
factors that suppress moral hypocrisy and lead to consistent behavior instead. People usually refrain 
from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards or deeply held moral values (Bandura 1991, 
Aquino and Reed 2002, Effron and Monin 2010). A deviation from their moral identity creates self-
condemnation, which is the greatest possible punishment according to Bandura (1991, p. 19). 
Similarly, Batson (2006) states that for hypocrisy to occur the desire for the preferred distribution has 
to outweigh the desire to uphold the relevant moral principle. Furthermore, he argues that ambiguity in 
the transgression encourages hypocrisy, as it grants wiggle room and the possibility to reinterpret 
behavior in the desired way. 
Opposed to hypocritical behavior, Mazar et al. (2008) identified situations where participants did not 
say one thing and do the other, but rather stuck to their self-concept and acted consistent. They 
mention the attention to standards as an important factor that influences behavior. For example, their 
study shows that participants cheated less after trying to remember and write down the Ten 
Commandments or after being reminded of an honor-code. Such behavior relates to an individual’s 
self-concept which states how that individual views and perceives himself. If someone has a strong 
belief in his own morality he wants to maintain this aspect of his self-concept. Individuals therefore try 
to comply with their internal standards even when doing so results in sacrificing financial gains. This 
research shows that when people are mindful of their own moral standards they tend to act according 
to these standards. Therefore, thinking about recent instances of honest behavior should make the self-
concept with regard to honesty more salient and lead to behavior in line with this self-concept. 
In my previous experiment, treatments differed by the manipulation of participants’ moral credits. 
This manipulation was achieved by having participants write about recent situations where they either 
told the truth (treatment truth) or told a lie (treatment lie). Based on the design employed by Monin 
and Miller (2001) and Sachdeva et al. (2009) this manipulation assumed that moral credits increase in 
treatment truth and decrease in treatment lie. Yet, the research on dishonesty suggests that lying may 
not always reduce moral credits and that lying does not always constitute morally objectionable 
behavior. Mostly, the economic literature has looked at selfish black likes. These are lies that help the 
liar at the expense of the other side and it seems reasonable to assume that those lies decrease moral 
credits in the expected way as it is considered morally wrong to enrich oneself at the costs of others. 
But what about lies that are told to help other people? Often these so called white lies are told with 
good intentions and at no harm for the liar (Gneezy 2005). They represent only minor falsehoods told 
to protect others. Experimental evidence on white lies finds that people do indeed tell lies in order to 
increase another person’s payoff, even if it decreases their own (Erat and Gneezy 2011). Fischbacher 
and Utikal (2013) even report that in rare instances lies are told which only harm the liar and do not 
even help another person. 
DePaulo offers extensive resources on human lies (DePaulo and Bell 1996, DePaulo and Kashy 1996, 
DePaulo et al. 1996, DePaulo and Kashy 1998, DePaulo 2004, DePaulo et al. 2004). A similar 
distinction between white and black lies is provided there. DePaulo et al. (1996) performed a diary 
study where participants were instructed to write down every lie they told every day for the period of 
one week. Additionally they provided information about the how’s and why’s of each lie. This 
procedure revealed that about 45% of all lies were self-centered, i.e. for personal advantage, and 25% 
were other-oriented, i.e. told to protect another person. Furthermore, the research revealed that 
participants often felt little to no distress after telling a lie or indicated that both, they and the target, 
would have felt worse, had they told the truth instead. This suggests that a huge difference within lies 
exists and the general assumption that writing a story about an instance where a lie is told may not 
necessarily lead to a decrease of moral credits. Therefore a more detailed approach has to be taken by 
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looking at stories individually to determine what kind of lie (and similarly truth) was told and how this 
ultimately affected moral credits. 
3. Experimental Design and Coding Procedure 
In the previous paper (Nagel 2014) I followed the design from Monin and Miller (2001) for the 
manipulation of moral credentials (task 1) and Sachdeva et al. (2009) for the manipulation of moral 
credits (task 2). Afterwards participants engaged in a deception game (Gneezy 2005), where only a 
sender is informed about the payoffs resulting from two possible options. He sends one of two 
possible messages to the receiver (e.g. "You receive a higher payoff from option X (Y)"). The receiver 
then decides which option to implement. With this design it is possible to identify if the truth or a lie 
was sent. To assess how this decision was influenced by previous (dis)honesty, I manipulated 
participants’ credentials and credits with regard to honesty. The two tasks asked participants to 
indicate their agreement to statements suggesting to utilize dishonesty (task 1) and furthermore to 
write a self-relevant story about themselves (task 2). The treatments differed by the framing of the 
statements and the content of the self-relevant story. In treatment truth, participants indicated 
(dis)agreement to statements that suggested using blatant dishonesty (e.g. you have to lie in order to be 
successful in life). This provided them with credentials of honest behavior, since strong disagreement 
to such statements is expected. Afterwards they wrote a story about a situation where they recently 
told the truth even so this was difficult. Remembering a situation of honest behavior was expected to 
increase moral credits. In treatment lie, participants indicated their agreement to statements that were 
more ambiguous (e.g. you have to lie sometimes in order to be successful in life). The ambiguity 
introduced by the word "sometimes" made strict honesty harder to justify and resulted in more 
agreement. Consequently, no credentials of honesty were acquired. Afterwards participants wrote 
about a situation where they recently told a lie. This was expected to decrease their moral credits as 
they thought about a situation where they personally behaved immoral as they told a lie. A third 
treatment had neutrally framed tasks that required participants to indicate agreement and write a story 
about topics that were relevant in the news during the time of the experiment. This provided a baseline 
treatment against which the two manipulation treatments could be tested. This setup resulted in three 
treatments with (1) no change of credentials and credits (baseline), (2) the provision of credentials for 
honesty and an increase of moral credits (treatment truth) and (3) no provision of credentials and a 
decrease of moral credits (treatment lie). The results show that the manipulation of credentials and 
credits worked as expected, but still I was unable to identify evidence in favor of licensing or 
cleansing. Rates of truth-telling and lying remained stable over all three treatments and did not differ 
significantly. Yet, as the literature on lying suggests, not every lie may necessarily decrease moral 
credits. As participants were free to write about any lie that came to their mind, it is possible that some 
participants wrote about lies which were not morally condemnable as they helped or protected others. 
Therefore, I employ a coding procedure to identify such differences in lies (and possible truths as well) 
and to obtain a better understanding about participants’ behavior. 
For this coding process an exact typed transcript of each hand-written story was produced. All stories 
were then transferred to an online platform
18
 to allow for fast and easy coding. The coders were five 
student assistants who were paid for the coding procedure. They were blind to the hypotheses of this 
study. The coders had to access the webpage where they received some general information and 
instructions about how the coding process would work. Each story was presented on an individual 
page followed by eight questions. These questions were developed to quantify the stories with regard 
to certain dimensions. As the only additional information, participants’ gender was stated at the top of 
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each page since in many cases this reduced ambiguity about who the participant was talking about 
(e.g. "my friend" could either indicate a good friend or indicate a relationship). The stories and 
questions were presented to each of the five coders individually and coding could be paused and 
resumed whenever necessary. 
To quantify the stories, relevant dimensions were identified that needed to be assessed by the coders. 
Based on the literature on lying (DePaulo and Bell 1996, DePaulo and Kashy 1996, DePaulo et al. 
1996, DePaulo and Kashy 1998, DePaulo 2004, DePaulo et al. 2004, Erat and Gneezy 2011) and the 
taxonomies presented there, I developed a set of eight questions which would help in obtaining 
additional information about the intent of the truth-teller/liar and possibly identify how moral credits 
had changed in unexpected ways. Each individual question assessed one of the following categories: 
recipient of truth/lie (Q1), subject of truth/lie (Q2), consequences for participant himself (Q3), 
consequences for another person (Q4), hypothetical consequences of alternative behavior (Q5), level 
of morality (Q6), feelings of having done something good (Q7) and feelings of pride/shame (Q8)
19
. 
Coders assessed the questions on a 7-point scale in case of question 1 and on 5-point scales for 
questions 2-8. Table 1 summarizes the questions and answers used for the coding procedure. 
Question Treatment Truth Treatment Lie Answers 
Q1 The truth was told to... The lie was told to... 
Partner in life; best friend; parents; 
other members of family; friends; 
other known person; unknown 
person 
Q2 
The subject told the truth 
about... 
The subject lied about... 
him/herself; another person (5 point 
scale) 
Q3 
For the subject himself the 
consequences of telling the 
truth were... 
For the subject himself the 
consequences of the lie 
were... 
very bad; very good (5 point scale) 
Q4 
For another person the 
consequences of telling the 
truth were... 
For another person the 
consequences of the lie 
were... 
very bad; very good (5 point scale) 
Q5 
If the subject had told a lie 
instead of telling the truth 
he would have... 
If the subject had told the 
truth instead of telling a lie 
he would have... 
felt worse; felt better (5 point scale) 
Q6 
Would it have been better 
to lie from a moral 
perspective? 
Would it have been better to 
tell the truth from a moral 
perspective? 
no, not better at all; yes, much 
better (5 point scale) 
Q7 
Does the subject perceive 
telling the truth to have 
done something good? 
Does the subject perceive 
the lie to have done 
something good? 
no; yes (5 point scale) 
Q8 
In the described situation 
the subject all in all is... 
In the described situation the 
subject all in all is... 
ashamed; proud (5 point scale) 
Table 1: Questions and answers used for the coding procedure (original questions were in German) 
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 Q1, Q2 and Q5 are inspired by DePaulo et al. (1996). Q3 and Q4 are based on Erat and Gneezy (2011). 
31 
Overall, 292 students from the University of Passau participated in the original experiment
20
. For the 
qualitative analysis in this study only the data from the senders in treatment truth and treatment lie can 
be used, reducing the sample to a total of 97 observations (48 senders in treatment truth and 49 senders 
in treatment lie). Of these, 70.1% were female and the mean age was 22.6 years. 
4. Inter-Rater Agreement and Descriptive Statistics  
As a measure for inter-rater agreement the intra-class correlation coefficient ICC(3,k)
21
 was calculated 
and to obtain one single value for each question, individual ratings from the five raters were averaged. 
This resulted in eight unique values to quantify each story on the given dimensions. The values for 
inter-rater agreement as well as the descriptive statistics of each question are reported in Table 2. 
 Treatment Truth Treatment Lie 
 ICC(3,k) Mean Values ICC(3,k) Mean Values 
Q1 0.98 M=4.67 
SD=1.55 
0.99 M=4.92 
SD=1.57 
Q2 0.94 M=2.45 
SD=1.57 
0.98 M=1.40 
SD=1.03 
Q3 0.83 M=2.5 
SD=0.72 
0.80 M=4.21 
SD=0.54 
Q4 0.87 M=2.89 
SD=0.90 
0.86 M=2.55 
SD= 0.77 
Q5 0.69 M=1.85 
SD=0.62 
0.61 M=2.34 
SD=0.56 
Q6 0.30 M=1.43 
SD=0.36 
0.67 M=3.49 
SD=0.75 
Q7 0.73 M=3.78 
SD=0.77 
0.77 M=3.03 
SD=0.97 
Q8 0.74 M=3.5 
SD=0.64 
0.71 M=2.9 
SD=0.64 
Table 2: Inter-rater-agreement and mean values in both treatments 
Highest agreement among raters is observed for Q1 and Q2 (ICC0.94). This is not surprising as the 
receiver of the truth/lie (Q1) as well as the subject (Q2) is in most cases unambiguous and therefore 
easy to assess. The lowest agreement is observed for Q6 (ICC=0.30 in treatment truth). Here it was 
asked if it would have been better to lie (tell the truth) instead of telling the truth (lying) from a moral 
perspective. The low agreement reveals that this question was difficult to assess and resulted in 
heterogeneity in raters’ answers. This could be the case because of the hypothetical nature of the 
question which involved raters to guess about participants’ feelings if they had acted differently. 
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 For the recruitment of participants and providing laboratory resources I kindly thank PAULA – the Passau 
Experimental Laboratory. 
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 Ultimately, my goal was to obtain one single value for each question and participant calculated as the average 
over all raters. Furthermore, raters are fixed and not randomly selected from a larger group of raters. In this case 
the ICC(3,k) applies (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). 
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Overall, low agreement is observed for this question only. Raters’ agreement for all other questions is 
sufficiently high. This shows that for the most part raters agreed in their assessments of the individual 
stories. Values are therefore reliable for the categorization of stories. 
Comparing the mean values for treatment truth and treatment lie confirms that the manipulation of 
treatments worked as expected. The differences between treatments reflect the general assumption that 
honest behavior is morally desirable whereas lying is morally objectionable. Except for Q1, where no 
difference between treatments is to be expected, all other values differ significantly between treatment 
truth and treatment lie (t-tests, p<0.05). The truth is equally told about oneself as about another person 
(Q2, M=2.45), whereas a lie is told mostly about oneself (M=1.40). Lying results in favorable 
consequences for the liar (Q3, M=4.21) and neither very good nor very bad consequences for others 
(Q4, M=2.55), whereas consequences of truth-telling are mixed for the participant (M=2.5) and for 
others (M=2.89). When telling the truth, participants would not have felt better had they lied instead 
(Q5, M=1.85), compared to liars, who would have felt a bit better when telling the truth instead 
(M=2.34). Truth-tellers perceived themselves to do more good (Q7, M=3.78) than liars (M=3.03) and 
lastly, telling the truth resulted in more feelings of pride (Q8, M=3.5) compared to telling a lie 
(M=2.9). 
5. Results for Consistent Behavior 
Having obtained mean values for each participant’s story, these can be matched with the data from the 
deception game. This lets me identify how individual differences in participants’ stories within a 
treatment result in differences of subsequent truth-telling behavior. I ran individual logit regressions 
with truth as the dependent variable and the mean value of each individual question as the independent 
variable (see Appendix A for the full regression results).  
In treatment truth no significant coefficients (p<0.1) are observed. This indicates that truth-telling in 
the deception game cannot be explained by differences between participants’ stories. The only 
coefficient that comes close to significant levels is observed for Q1 (=-0.28, p=0.184), where raters 
indicated whom the truth was told to. An additional one-sided t-test (p=0.09) reveals that a participant 
who told a lie in the deception game described to tell the truth to a person not as closely related to him 
(M=5.04) compared to participants sending a truthful message (M=4.43). This result indicates 
consistent behavior if a truth told to a closely related person is assumed to increase moral credits more 
than a truth told to a person only distantly related. DePaulo and Kashy (1998) found that participants 
lied less to closely related persons and felt more uncomfortable when doing so. These results give 
reason to assume that lies told to closely related persons reduce moral credits relatively more and that 
likewise a truth told to a closely related person increases moral credits relatively more. Therefore, 
relationship closeness may act as a proxy for moral credits. The closer the relationship, the more moral 
credits are gained by truth-telling or lost by lying. A truth told to a close family member is expected to 
increase moral credits to a higher degree than a truth told to a stranger. The results therefore show that 
participants did not engage in moral licensing. Rather, those participants who had acquired the most 
moral credits, engaged in truth-telling most often. 
In treatment lie, the only coefficient significantly different from zero is observed for Q6 (=-1.06, 
p=0.035). This question asked whether it would have been better to tell the truth instead of lying from 
a moral perspective. The negative coefficient shows that if raters indicated that it would have been 
much better to tell the truth from a moral perspective, participants lied more often in the subsequent 
deception game. Thus, if participants wrote about situations that were considered highly immoral by 
the raters (indicated by the fact that telling the truth would have been much better), they sent a truthful 
message less often. Or, turning this the other way around, participants who told a lie which was rated 
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to be on the same level of morality as telling the truth, subsequently told the truth more often. I argue 
that this provides evidence for consistent behavior rather than for moral cleansing, since highly 
immoral behavior is followed by a lie in the deception game, whereas behavior that is regarded as 
morally acceptable (even if it resulted from telling a lie) is followed by the truth. Looking at marginal 
effects shows that a story where raters indicated that telling the truth would not have been better from 
a moral perspective (indicated by M=1 for Q6) resulted in 98.8% of truth-telling in the deception 
game. A highly immoral story on the other hand, where telling the truth was rated to be much better 
instead of lying (M=5 for Q6), resulted in only 29.4% of truth-telling
22
. 
Coefficients for the other questions in treatment lie fail to meet standard levels of significance (p<0.1), 
nonetheless looking at the signs provides no reason to bring the previous results to question. Q7 asked 
whether the participant perceived his behavior as having done something good. The positive 
coefficient (=0.31, p=0.34) indicates that the more a participant perceived his lie as having done 
something good, the more truth is told in the deception game. A similar observation is obtained for 
Q8. An increase in pride for the lie told leads to an increase in truth-telling (=0.54, p=0.273). Q5 
asked how the participant would have felt had he told the truth instead of a lie. Higher values of Q5 
indicate that the participant would have felt better with alternative behavior, therefore feeling bad with 
his current behavior. This indicates that in line with the result from Q6, participants who told a lie that 
did something good or had good feelings or even feelings of pride for telling this lie, all told the truth 
more often in the deception game. 
Q3 and Q4 provide additional evidence of participants’ consistent behavior. Erat and Gneezy’s (2011) 
taxonomy can be used to categorize stories according to the consequences for the participant and for 
another person
23
. With this taxonomy, four distinct categories of truth-tellers and liars can be 
distinguished
24
. I define the category Pareto as resulting in positive consequences for the participant as 
well as for another person. Altruistic includes observations where consequences for another person 
were positive, but consequences for the participant were negative. Selfish includes stories where 
consequences are positive for the participant but negative for another person. Lastly, when 
consequences are negative for the participant as well as for another person stories are categorized as 
Spiteful. All four categories can result either after telling the truth (treatment truth) or after telling a lie 
(treatment lie). The scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the distribution of stories within these four 
categories. 
 
Figure 1: Categories of truths/lies based on Erat and Gneezy (2011) 
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 This result is robust to additionally controlling for receiver (Q1) and subject (Q2) of the lie. 
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 As in my experiment participants' did not describe any monetary payoffs, I substituted "payoff" with the more 
general term "consequence" for the coding procedure. 
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 Originally, this taxonomy was developed for lies, but I use it to categorize truth-telling likewise. 
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As is expected, the patterns differ distinctively between treatments. In treatment truth, most stories are 
coded as spiteful (35%), followed by altruistic (29%), selfish (10%) and lastly pareto (8%). In 
treatment lie, most lies are rated as selfish (76%), followed by pareto (16%) and altruistic (4%). 
Spiteful lies are not observed
25
. Matching these categories with behavior in the subsequent deception 
game reveals that truth-telling differs distinctly between categories. Figure 2 shows how often an 
honest message was sent in the deception game depending on the category of participants’ stories. 
 
Figure 2: Amount of truth- by category of truth/lie in the hand-written story 
In treatment truth, truth-telling amounts to 50% if a story was rated as either pareto or altruistic. Truth-
telling increases to 60% if the story described a selfish truth and to 71% if it described a spiteful one. 
In treatment lie on the other hand, truth-telling amounts to 75% after a pareto lie, 100% after an 
altruistic lie
26
 and 59% after a selfish lie. This shows that in treatment lie the lowest amount of truth-
telling is observed after participants described a selfish lie. The proportion of truth-telling in this 
category is significantly smaller compared to all other stories (one-tailed z-test, p=0.066). Thus, truth-
telling decreases after participants described a selfish lie. These are participants who reported a 
situation where they told a lie that had positive consequences for themselves but negative 
consequences for another person, i.e. told a lie for personal gain. Consistent with the selfish lie they 
described, these participants had the highest rate of telling a lie in the deception game as well. Instead 
of engaging in moral cleansing, these participants acted consistent to what they described in their 
stories and continued to lie. 
In treatment truth, the proportion of truth-telling after a spiteful truth is not significantly larger 
compared to the other stories, but standard levels of significance are missed only slightly (one-tailed z-
test, p=0.143). This may be interpreted as additional (weak) evidence for consistent behavior. Telling a 
spiteful truth obviously required a lot of courage. In order to encourage participants to think about 
situations where the truth was not the easiest path to take, the task explicitly stated to describe a 
situation where telling the truth was difficult. This difficulty is reflected in the negative consequences 
for the truth-teller as indicated by Q3. If furthermore consequences for another person are negative, it 
was probably very difficult to tell this truth in the given circumstances. Choosing this option therefore 
should result in a large increase of moral credits, since the morally right path was taken at high costs. 
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Participants describing such situations are those with the highest rates of truth-telling in the deception 
game. Even after having described the story and being aware of their large amount of moral credits, 
participants did not engage in licensed behavior and felt free to lie, but instead continued to tell the 
truth. 
In summary, these results provide no support for licensed or cleansing behavior but rather suggest that 
participants acted consistent to what they described in their stories. Of course, participants did not 
literally act consistent. First, they described a lie, afterwards they told the truth. But this simple black 
and white view of truth-telling and lying falls short of identifying differences between different kinds 
of truths and lies and how these impact the moral balance. By performing a qualitative analysis, it was 
possible to identify these differences. A considerable amount of participants (20%) had no selfish 
motives in mind when telling a lie, but instead told lies that had positive consequences for other 
persons. Telling such a lie questions the initial assumption that dishonesty decreases moral credits. 
Obviously those participants told a lie, but their ultimate goal was to help or protect others. It seems 
questionable to argue that such behavior leads to a decrease of moral credits. Differentiating truths and 
lies more precisely showed a better picture of participants’ behavior and suggests that instead of moral 
self-regulation consistent behavior emerges. 
6. Discussion 
Possible reasons for the suppression of moral self-regulation can be attributed to the fear of appearing 
hypocritical. As Effron and Monin (2010) have shown, observers refused to license hypocritical 
behavior. Similarly, participants themselves might want to behave in a way to avoid the uncomfortable 
feelings of hypocrisy. While a license frees a person to act inconsistently, the forces of hypocrisy 
constrain one to consistent behavior. A licensing effect of a good deed can be suppressed if feelings of 
hypocrisy arise. Miller and Effron (2010) name three conditions that make hypocrisy especially likely. 
Firstly, hypocrisy arises if participants’ good behavior, that is supposed to create the license, reflects 
deeply held moral values. If this is the case, a deviation to opposite behavior is less likely even if a 
license to do so may be present. Honesty has to be considered as such a basic moral value. Participants 
therefore felt reluctant to lie because with writing a story about truth-telling they were reminded about 
the moral importance of honesty. Secondly, hypocrisy arises if the good and bad deed are within the 
same domain. If a person states to be honest, sincere, and upright and later makes a sexist remark that 
may be considered dismissive and inappropriate but not hypocritical. If on the other hand the same 
person tells a lie he will be considered a hypocrite. In my experiment the good deed, as well as the 
transgression, were in the domain of honesty, therefore making hypocrisy especially likely. Thirdly, 
the nature of the transgression plays an important role. In Monin and Miller’s (2001) experiment the 
transgression was to voice a sexist or racist opinion by favoring a male or white person in hypothetical 
scenarios. Sachdeva et al. (2009) let participants chose to give money to a charity or abstain from it. 
But charitable giving as well as politically incorrect statements are acts that need to be seen in context 
and are often hard to endorse or denounce on their own. They are ambiguous acts and are rated 
depending on context. The transgression in my experiment was sending a lie in the deception game. 
Consequences of this behavior are rather straightforward and not open to much interpretation. Sending 
a lie aims at enriching oneself at the cost of another person, since the gain of the sender is the loss of 
the receiver. In this situation hypocrisy arises more easily. Since all three conditions apply to my 
experiment it seems reasonable to assume that participants had feelings of hypocrisy to some extent. 
Even so they were anonymous during the experiment and no one could observe their actions, these 
feelings might have led them to consistent behavior as they did not want to appear hypocritical, not 
even to themselves.  
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Another motivation to behave consistent may be the desire to maintain the positive self-concept as an 
honest individual. According to the theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al. 2008) people are 
dishonest, as long as they can uphold their honest self-concept without being forced to update it. 
Categorization and attention to standards are identified to be the two mechanisms influencing the 
process of updating the self-concept. A dishonest action that can be categorized in more compatible 
terms (e.g. "I did not steal the pen, I merely borrowed it.") does not force an update of the self-concept 
and lets people still view themselves as honest individuals. Attention to the own moral standards on 
the other hand enforces a faster update of the self-concept. When participants are mindful of moral 
standards there is less room to elude these standards. Thus, if made aware of standards, people are 
more likely to stick to these standards as well. The possibility to categorize dishonesty in my 
experiment was low. There is little to no possibility to reinterpret a lie sent to the receiver in the 
deception game. Therefore, sending a lie forces participants to update their self-concept with this act 
of dishonesty. Additionally, especially in treatment truth, standards of honesty are made salient for 
participants. In task 1, participants were asked to agree to statements about honesty, where one person 
gives advice to another person. In this situation they revealed their general attitude towards honesty 
and voiced their opinion about how others should behave. This procedure made standards of honesty 
more salient. A high salience of standards and the missing possibility to categorize dishonesty made 
participants especially aware of possible dishonesty in the deception game. If they wanted to send a lie 
they would have been forced to update this self-concept and openly acknowledge their dishonest 
behavior. As the costs of updating may have been higher than the gains from lying, participants 
decided to act honest instead. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, the results from Nagel (2014) are discussed and the analysis is enriched by additional 
data from participants’ hand written stories. Instead of only differentiating by treatments and 
processing all stories about truth-telling and lying in an identical fashion, the approach presented in 
this study looks at individual differences within treatments. The experimental data suggested that 
truth-telling can lead to different amounts of moral credits and even lying may lead to an increase in 
moral credits in some circumstances. Based on the relevant literature I developed and employed a 
coding procedure which made it possible to categorize stories on multiple dimensions. Results from 
this coding procedure confirm the evidence found in the previous study. Looking at the regression 
results does not support the hypothesis that participants engaged in moral self-regulation and balanced 
truth-telling with lying or the other way around. Results rather suggest consistent behavior, if truth-
telling and lying are analyzed more carefully and not only at face value.  
In treatment truth, looking at the person the truth was told to supports the hypothesis of consistent 
behavior. Participants telling the truth to a closely related person and in consequence having increased 
their moral balance relatively more choose a truthful message more often. Instead of counter-balancing 
their good behavior with lying, those participants engaged in honest behavior even though moral 
credits for possible dishonesty are present. Consistent behavior is also observed in treatment lie. 
Telling a lie is immoral in most cases, but some lies are morally permissible or even considered 
necessary from a moral perspective. If participants wrote about lies that were rated to be morally 
acceptable, lies that were considered to do something good, or lies that result in feelings of pride, 
truth-telling increased in the deception game. All these instances relate to lies that are not expected to 
have a negative impact on the moral balance but rather are told to help or protect others, possibly at 
costs for the liar himself. Furthermore, the highest rate of lying was observed after participants 
described a selfish lie. A selfish lie resulted in a positive consequence for the liar and a negative 
consequence for another person. Consistent to describing such a lie, participants engaged in a selfish 
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lie in the deception game. There, telling a lie is expected to increase the sender’s payoff at the cost of 
the receiver’s payoff. As possible reasons for the failure of moral self-regulation the fear of appearing 
hypocritical as well as the desire to maintain an honest self-concept could be identified. Describing 
honest behavior, but afterwards engaging in dishonesty, may have induced feelings of hypocrisy and 
in consequence self-contempt. These feelings possibly outbalanced the moral license acquired from 
honest behavior. Furthermore, it can be argued that the experimental tasks made participants aware of 
the moral standard of honest behavior. Subsequently engaging in dishonesty would have contradicted 
these standards and threatened the self-concept. Instead of taking this burden, participants complied to 
standards and acted (consistently) honest.  
To gain more insights into moral self-regulation in the domain of honesty, future research could take a 
more careful look at how truth-telling and lying affects the moral balance. Motivation for dishonesty 
can have multiple reasons, the obvious one being selfishness. But people tell lies out of altruistic 
motives as well. Looking at the underlying motivation of dishonesty and how this motivation changes 
moral credits could offer further insights for moral self-regulation of truth-telling and lying.  
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Appendix A 
Regression Results for Treatment Truth 
truth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Q1  -0.28        
 (0.21)        
Q2  0.16       
  (0.20)       
Q3   -0.12      
   (0.41)      
Q4    -0.12     
    (0.33)     
Q5     -0.33    
     (0.48)    
Q6      0.34   
      (0.85)   
Q7       -0.12  
       (0.39)  
Q8        -0.09 
        (0.47) 
Constant 1.77 0.04 0.72 0.76 1.03 -0.06 0.88 0.74 
 (1.08) (0.55) (1.08) (1.01) (0.94) (1.25) (1.52) (1.66) 
         
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Pseudo R-squared 0.030 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regression Results for Treatment Lie 
truth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Q1 -0.01        
 (0.19)        
Q2  0.05       
  (0.30)       
Q3   -1.07      
   (0.70)      
Q4    0.30     
    (0.41)     
Q5     -0.26    
     (0.54)    
Q6      -1.06**   
      (0.50)   
Q7       0.31  
       (0.32)  
Q8        0.54 
        (0.50) 
Constant 0.69 0.57 5.18* -0.13 1.25 4.43** -0.28 -0.93 
 (1.00) (0.51) (3.03) (1.07) (1.32) (1.86) (0.99) (1.44) 
         
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.009 0.004 0.085 0.015 0.020 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Abstract 
Is there a financial return to a favorable impression? We run an 
experiment to investigate whether looters can reduce punishment by 
manipulating their record. They decide between a high and a low 
probability of looting money from a collection box designated to a 
charity. An observer decides on the level of altruistic punishment, 
noticing the looters past record and whether looting took place. We 
find that looters are willing to pay a fee for dressing up their record. 
But observers do not reduce punishment in response and looters do 
not even expect them to do so. Impression management is thus 
motivated intrinsically and not financially. From a purely monetary 
perspective investments on impression management are illspent. 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: K42, D03, C91 
Keywords: Self-Image, Corporate Social Responsibility, Virtue Ethics, Altruistic Punishment.  
  
                                                     
  Johann Graf Lambsdorff is full professor in economic theory at the University of Passau, Germany. 
Contact address: Innstrasse 27, D-94032 Passau, jlambsd@uni-passau.de.  Volker Nagel is doctoral scholar at 
the University of Passau, Germany. The authors are grateful to Manuel Schubert and Marcus Giamattei and to 
participants of the brownbag economics seminar at the University of Passau, April 16, 2014, for helpful 
comments. 
43 
1. Introduction  
Beyond pure profit maximization companies engage, to varying degrees, in activities that are not 
prima facie related to their advantage. They show interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
cooperate with others to advance public goods, preserve the commons, or abstain from paying bribes. 
Such engagement is often actively marketed, sometimes even exaggerated or falsely claimed. 
Portraying a related corporate commitment has the potential of advancing also profits. But do the 
benefits of such an impression management outbalance the costs?  
 
These questions are empirically difficult to assess. Evidence is sometimes reported of a positive 
correlation between public measures of CSR and financial performance. But empirically the dividing 
line between CSR and impression management is difficult to draw. Is self-reported CSR truthful or 
part of impression management? Positive correlations between impressions gathered on CSR and 
financial performance might be driven by reverse causality: Good financial results provide more room 
for a company to increase CSR activities. At the same time we are not aware of robust evidence from 
the field. Requests for experiments with increased control of variables and causation have thus been 
raised (Schmitz and Schrader 2013). Given this lack of evidence we design a laboratory experiment. 
Participants can engage in CSR (by avoiding looting), can engage in impression management (dress 
up their past performance) and are confronted with counterparts who can engage in altruistic 
punishment. This allows us to cover new ground in determining the financial rewards to impression 
management and address a variety of questions: Who engages in impression management, the ones 
who engage in CSR or rather the self-seeking firms? How would companies react to public 
punishment that may follow a scandal? Does impression management increase revenues and profits? 
 
There exists a widespread, but not uncontested, viewpoint that corporate social responsibility is only 
justified if it increases profits. It should align with shareholders’ interests and provide strategic 
advantages vis-à-vis consumers, employees, investors and regulators (Friedman 1970; Gallagher 2005; 
Amalric and Hauser 2005; Hooghiemstra 2000). Such advantages are diverse. CSR might signal high 
profits, superior quality, or favorable working environments. It might dampen public protests targeted 
at environmental misconduct, ease governmental regulation, or improve access to capital (Schmitz and 
Schrader 2013). But CSR may also go along with an agency conflict. Managers may over-invest in 
CSR while seeking private non-monetary benefits (Barnea and Rubin 2006, Cheng et al. 2014). 
 
Debate arose on whether companies should market their good deeds and impress others. Marketing 
would help reap the strategic advantages, turning CSR into good business (Lantos 2001). But critics 
have warned of “managerial capture”. Impression management, the desire to be seen favorably, entails 
that engagement in CSR is exploited for strategic purposes, companies collect and disseminate only 
favorable information, thus painting a biased image of their engagement. This bias might be 
anticipated by target groups who adjust their notion of CSR accordingly. A favorable impression may 
no longer be seen as a truthful commitment to act ethically (Valor 2005; Owen et al. 2000). Whether 
to engage in CSR and whether to engage in impression management can thus be seen as two distinct 
decisions. To illustrate these considerations, take the three following examples. 
 
Foxconn is a supplier for Apple that assembles the iPhone and the iPad and was reported to force 
workers to work more than 60 hours a week. Workplace safety and living conditions at factory-owned 
dorms were criticized as being inhuman (Forbes: Apple’s Supplier Labor Practices In China 
Scrutinized After Foxconn, Pegatron Reviews, 12 December 2013; New York Times: In China, 
Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, 25 January 2012). This is supposed to have caused the suicide of 
more than a dozen workers between 2010 and 2012. In 2012 a petition was signed by hundreds of 
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thousands of consumers, requesting Apple to improve working conditions in China. Apple’s approach 
since 2007 has been to request suppliers to abandon such practices. This went along with requirements 
to sign up to codes of conduct, carry out repeated audits and publish responsibility reports. But given 
the persistent violations of human rights, critics have argued that Apple lacks the will to pay the price 
for rigorously improved working conditions. The core interest of Apple, it is argued, is to maintain the 
status quo while avoiding the associated embarrassment. In our terms, Apple is criticized for a narrow 
focus on impression management. But how would consumers react if no such impression management 
would take place? 
 
Mining is a business that involves close ties to local politicians and substantial risks of environmental 
damage. Dilemmas between profit and corporate social responsibility are thus standard to this sector. 
In West Papua, Indonesia, a joint-venture by Freeport and Rio Tinto mines the world’s third-largest 
copper deposit and the world’s biggest gold mine (New York Times: Below a Mountain of Wealth, a 
River of Waste, 27 December 2005) faced such a dilemma. Since 1997, the Indonesian Environment 
Ministry repeatedly warned the company that Freeport was breaching environmental laws and that its 
waste killed all life in the rivers. Other allegations link human rights abuses and the killing of an 
estimated 160 people by the Indonesian military to the mining interests. But contrary to the case of 
Apple there appears to be little effort to paint more favorable impressions. No corporate excuses can 
be spotted, hardly any improvements are announced and documentation on audits remain scarce or 
inaccessible. Instead, the company supported the local Indonesian military with multimillion dollars in 
order to corroborate control and suppression. But is it a wise decision to devote so few resources to the 
company’s impression? The answer will largely depend on whether companies with an unfavorable 
impression are punished by stakeholders. 
 
Such a link between a company’s appearance and punishment can be observed for the case of bribery. 
Companies run into conflicts of interest when profitable contracts can only be achieved by help of 
bribes to public officials and politicians. The last two decades have seen many companies take a strict 
approach towards abstaining from the payment of bribes, which parallels the increased risks, fines and 
penalties imposed by the SEC in the USA (Shearman and Sterling 2013; Lambsdorff 2013). Recent 
legislation discussed how companies should be penalized for wrongdoing. In the UK legislation holds 
a company C guilty of an offence if an associated person bribes another person unless the company 
can “prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C 
from undertaking such conduct” (UK Bribery Act 2010). But criticism has been raised that proved 
procedures are a type of impression management and that they may be ineffective. Laufer (2006: 99-
129) warns against the type of leniency implemented by the UK Bribery Act. This type of leniency 
reduces the repressive pressure of the legal code and induces firms to invest in potentially useless 
compliance systems rather than in eliminating actual misconduct. Such compliance systems represent 
methods of impression management rather than organizational methods that reduce actual bribery. Is it 
thus a wise decision to grant leniency to companies that impress judges with their procedures? 
 
This study assesses the causes and returns to impression management. For this purpose we designed an 
experiment where observers (just like customers) were willing to engage in altruistic punishment and 
made the level of punishment dependent on observed infractions of a potential perpetrator (a 
company) but also the intentions (and virtuousness) they assigned to the perpetrator. This resembles 
the behavior of customers who might be willing to boycott a company that lacks CSR. A perpetrator 
decides between a high and a low probability of looting money from a collection box designated to a 
charity. Observers are endowed with resources, observe the looters’ past record and whether looting 
occurred in the current round. They can allocate some of their resources to punishment. Depending on 
the treatment of the experiment looters can manipulate their past record for a fee.  
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We observe, first, that punishment motivates perpetrators to reduce looting unless they can manipulate 
their record. In the latter case, perpetrators continue with their preferred level of looting and spend 
more for impression management. Second, the well performing companies engage less in impression 
management, those who choose the low probability of looting. Perpetrators who choose the high 
probability of looting devote more resources to impression management. Third, in line with this 
finding, observers were able to correctly infer the chosen probability (in a sense, the underlying 
intention). Impression management is thus not capable of completely diffusing the informativeness of 
a perpetrators past record. Fourth, observers substantially punish looting when observing a history that 
cannot be manipulated. But they care little for a history that is up to manipulation. This brings about 
our fifth finding: money spent for impression management does not have a financial return. 
Perpetrators do not even expect lower punishment after manipulating their history. This suggests that 
the advantage from impression management is largely intrinsic. An improved self-image is cultivated 
for its own sake.  
 
Section 2 reviews the relevant experimental literature and explains why a favorable self-image may 
have an intrinsic value. Section 3 explains our experimental design. Section 4 derives our hypotheses. 
We report the experimental proceedings and our findings in section 5 and section 6. We discuss why 
our conclusions might be relevant for corporate policy in the concluding section 7.  
2. Literature Review  
Recent experimental studies suggest that impression managements yields little return. Observers tend 
to give little credit to a perpetrator’s history. One such piece of evidence relates to apologies, which 
can be seen as a type of impression management. Ho (2012) investigates the role of apologies as 
signals for improving one’s trustworthiness. He employs a trust game where trustors can transfer up to 
10 tokens to a trustee who receives triple this amount and can reciprocate by purchasing lottery tickets, 
each increasing the trustor’s chance to win 20 tokens by 5%. Trustors are informed only about the 
winning of the lottery but not about how many tickets the trustee purchased. In case of not winning the 
lottery, the trustee can send a costly signal “I am sorry”. These signals improve future transfers to the 
trustee. But for 1 token spent for an apology future transfers increase only by 0.7.
27
 Expenses for 
improved impressions thus fall short of their return. 
 
Tiedens (2001) investigates the returns to apologies in politics. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton was 
seen to have lied with respect to his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. In an experiment, videos 
where shown to participants on Clinton’s grand jury testimony, one where Clinton appears to 
apologize regarding the Lewinsky affair, and one where he is angry about the cause of the 
investigation. Participants were then asked whether Clinton should maintain his status and power. This 
was approved to significantly higher degrees by those who saw the angry Clinton. An apology thus 
comes with a cost of losing status, while having a negative return to a politician’s future career.  
 
                                                     
27
 Ho (2012: 153) writes with respect to agents (trustees): "Regressing the continuation value on the number of 
tokens an agent spends on an apology (including period fixed effects) shows that each token spent on an apology 
yields the agent 1.37 tokens (standard error = 0.35) in future profit; this result is robust to adding controls for 
prior beliefs and agent fixed effects." This coefficient of 1.37, however, is biased upward because trustees that 
return many tokes have a higher tendency to apologize. The actual yield from a token spent for an apology is 
obtained when controlling for agents (trustees) fixed effects. In personal correspondence Ben Ho reported the 
outcome from such a controlled regression to be 0.692 (standard error = 0.33). Returns to investments into 
apologies are thus below 1.  
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Psychological research on impression management has focused on human (rather than corporate) 
behavior. Humans have a tendency to portray themselves in a favorable light and devote resources in 
order to convince others of their job-related capacities, their willingness to devote effort, the goodness 
of their intentions, or the virtuousness of their character and the flawlessness of their lifestyle. 
Impression management is defined as the situational manipulation of the image portrayed towards 
others with the goal of getting approval (Snyder 1977; Schlenker 1980; Bromley 1993). Impression 
management has been investigated lately in relation to job interviews, where applicants involve tactics 
to distort their attributes while interviewers seek to anticipate these tactics in order to maintain a good 
person-job fit (Ingold et al. 2014; Kristof-Brown et al. 2002). Another line of research has set out to 
determine the cognitive costs. Vohs et al. (2005) find that impression management can deplete 
cognitive capacities by requiring subjects to override their dispositional tendencies.  
 
This early research on impression management implied that there should be a return to such an 
investment, the approval obtained by others. But it was widely recognized that there can be an intrinsic 
value to a favorable self-image. In particular, more recent research recognized that humans cultivate a 
stable perception of themselves, which assures not only others but even themselves of the goodness of 
their deeds and virtues (Swann and Bosson 2010). This type of assurance has its own value. From this 
perspective a favorable impression might be sought even if it is not expected to bring about a 
monetary return.  
 
Yamagishi et al. (2009) present evidence that individuals are willing to forgo financial rewards when 
these are considered to be unfair. They run an altered version of the ultimatum game where a proposer 
offers a split of money which can be accepted or rejected by the responder. Contrary to a standard 
ultimatum game however, rejection only reduces the responder’s payoff to zero leaving the proposer 
with the money allocated to him. Furthermore, the rejection of an offer is not communicated to the 
proposer, eliminating the possibility to express anger towards the proposer and at least symbolically 
punish him. Even without such symbolic punishment, a substantial rejection rate is observed. This 
behavior by responders might be explained by their desire to maintain their self-image. 
 
Substantial experimental evidence has been gathered on the conflict between selfish interests and self-
image. Batson et al. (1997) let subjects assign a pleasant and a dull task between themselves and 
another player. Subjects were given the option to delegate the decision to a coin-flip. 10 subjects 
decided in favor of the coin but of these only 1 reported that the coin assigned the dull task to 
themselves. The authors conclude (p. 1342): “Apparently, some of those flipping the coin took 
advantage of this ambiguity to hide self-interest in the guise of morality.” In a subsequent publication 
(Batson et al. 1999) participants played the same game but saw themselves in a mirror as a method for 
increasing self-awareness. In this case, 5 out of 10 participants who flipped the coin assigned the dull 
task to themselves. This is suggestive of the idea that participants deceived themselves when tossing 
the coin. They believe to act morally but can no longer do so when a mirror increases their self-
awareness.  
 
One method for aligning self-interest with a favorable self-image is to engage in self-deception. 
Subjects have been found to carry out immoral acts while failing to update their self-image (Chugh et 
al. 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006). They uphold their positive self-image  towards others and 
towards themselves  by denying responsibility for unfair or immoral outcomes. This denial of 
responsibility can arise if the link between a decision and the immoral or unfair outcome is less 
straightforward. Subjects can fabricate excuses and bias downward their own responsibility by shifting 
it to random procedures such as the tossing of a coin (Batson et al. 1997, Shalvi et al. 2011, Lönnquist 
et al. 2013), to the ambiguity of the environment (Murnighan et al. 2001; Mazar et al. 2008, Dana et 
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al. 2006 and 2007, Haisley and Weber 2010) or to other subjects (Gino et al. 2009, Mazar et al. 2008, 
Paharia et al. 2009, Mazar and Aggarwal 2011, Conrads et al. 2013, Bartling and Fischbacher 2012, 
Hamman et al. 2010, Coffmann 2011).  
 
It will be difficult for humans to fabricate excuses if acts of self-seeking are blunt and straightforward. 
But they may retain their desire to wash away their sins by manipulating their history. Experimental 
evidence that would be supportive of such a motivation has been reported by Zhong and Liljenquist 
(2006) who observe that subjects that were confronted with a morally objectionable memory were 
more likely to wash their hands afterwards. Subjects were asked to recall an unethical deed or copy a 
story of an unethical act. This might impact their desire for moral purity and trigger a corresponding 
act of cleansing, which was significantly more pronounced as compared to a control group who 
recalled an ethical deed or copied a story of a selfless act. This type of moral cleansing has been linked 
to charitable engagement by Sachdeva et al. (2009). They equally prime subjects by recalling either a 
selfless or an unethical act, the latter group of subjects donating significantly more. Impression 
management may thus be an act of moral cleansing, restoring the sense of purity vis-à-vis others or 
oneself. 
 
Humans would thus be willing to spend money for an improved self-image. They may not care that 
such money does not bring about financial advantages. A favorable self-image has its own intrinsic 
value and investments would be carried out even if outsiders provide no monetary return. The costs 
and benefits of impression management are thus indicative of the underlying motivation. If returns are 
high, investments might be driven by the desire to reap financial benefits. If expected returns are poor, 
humans (and companies) care for their self-image as an intrinsic value or form biased beliefs about 
their capacity to influence their impression.  
3. Experimental Design and Treatments 
Subjects are willing to exercise altruistic punishment. Substantial experimental evidence has been 
gathered, revealing that humans devote resources to punish the misdeeds of perpetrators even if their 
personal interests are largely unaffected by a transgression (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Egas and Riedl 
2008; Turillo et al. 2002; Kahneman et al. 1986; Eckel and Grossman 1996). This behavior is in 
particular related to the willingness to enforce a social norm, for example related to fairness or the 
protection of public goods. We thus employ these methods to detect how perpetrators interact with 
observers who might engage in altruistic punishment. This parallels a company that might increase 
profits by violating human rights and consumers that might boycott the company’s products.  
 
A collection box contains 1000 Taler per round, designated to the charity Doctors without Borders. 
Across 40 rounds a perpetrator P who is initially endowed with 100 Taler chooses between urn A 
where the probability of looting is 80% (4 red balls who imply looting and 1 white ball) and urn B 
with the probability amounting to 20% (1 red ball and 4 white balls). In case of looting 100 Taler are 
transferred from a collection box, increasing P’s payoffs to 200. A laboratory session consists of 10 
players in the role of P, such that potentially all money in the collection box is looted. P is randomly 
matched to one of 10 observers O who can devote resources to punishing P. O is initially endowed 
with 150 Taler and can spend up to 20 Taler for punishment. Each Taler spent for punishment reduces 
P’s payoff by 5 Taler. The reduction generates a loss to both players and the money is not transferred 
back to the collection box. O observes whether in a current round P looted money, but not the choice 
of the urn. O may want to punish P and let the size of punishment depend on conjectures about P’s 
intentions or virtues. For this purpose O observes the signals about P’s history of looting from the last 
five periods. Each round ends with P deciding whether to manipulate the last signal, potentially 
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turning a red ball into a white ball. In case of manipulation only the signals of past behavior are 
modified, but the incidence of looting is not made undone. We run three different treatments and 
differentiate by costs for changing the signal. In the baseline treatment a change of signal is not 
possible, reflecting prohibitively high costs. P has no chance to engage in impression management 
because each ball drawn enters his history as it is. In the high cost treatment changing a signal costs 20 
Taler, in the low cost treatment costs are 10 Taler. Both players are informed about these costs. 
 
One reason why the costs for manipulating ones record exceed the benefits would arise if perpetrators 
hold biased beliefs on how their past record may impress observers. We run our experiment for 40 
rounds so subjects have sufficient time to learn about actual levels of punishment. Beliefs about the 
returns to a clean record should thus converge towards realized levels. To determine how beliefs about 
punishment are formed, we asked perpetrators to state their expected punishment every period based 
on the draw of the ball and their current history. Perpetrators were asked to answer the question for 
expected punishment while observers decided for actual punishment levels. This makes it easy to 
compare beliefs and realized values. To incentivize answers, we rewarded perpetrators with a bonus 
payment of 10 Taler if their expectations matched the realized punishment (+/- 1 Taler). This allows 
us to detect whether belief formation is indeed rational or whether expected returns to a manipulated 
record are biased upward.  
 
Likewise, we asked observers to state their expectations about the perpetrator’s choice of urn in every 
period. They were asked to state their beliefs about the perpetrator’s pick of urn before they had 
decided for their punishment and before a new period began. We were especially interested in how 
observers rate a perpetrator’s history and infer the choice of urn from the information a history 
provides. When remunerating observers for correct expectations we needed to take into account that 
the draw of the ball indicates the chosen urn with 80% probability correctly. We constructed 
incentives in such a way, that the expected bonus was the same for both urns regardless of the draw of 
the ball. After a red ball was drawn, observers got 3 Taler if they expected this draw to result from urn 
A and 12 Taler if it resulted from urn B. The expected bonus from both options is therefore identical 
(0.8*3=0.2*12). After a white ball was drawn, payoffs were reversed. Thus, we constrained observers 
to additionally evaluate a perpetrators history in order to form beliefs about his choice of urn. 
 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment took place in the classEx laboratory at the University of 
Passau in January and March 2014. We ran 6 sessions with 20 participants each. This resulted in a 
total of 120 participants, 20 perpetrators and 20 observers for each of the three treatments. Across all 
treatments, participants were on average 23 years old and 61% of all participants were female. The 
average length of a session was 83 minutes with the fastest session being completed after 71 minutes 
and the longest session taking 100 minutes. To determine participants’ payoffs, one period was 
randomly selected in every session. Participants earned 13.20€ on average (6.50€ min, 17.80€ max). 
On top of their individual payoffs, participants donated 168€ to Doctors without Borders, because in 
total 24 white balls were drawn in the payoff relevant periods and each white ball resulted in a 
donation of 7€.  
4. Hypotheses 
Our experiment lets us evaluate causes and returns of impression management and provides insights 
into the rationale of participants. Based on the related literature we derive a total of seven hypotheses 
that predict participants’ behavior. In the course of one experimental period, perpetrators first decide 
which urn to pick and second if they want to manipulate a red ball if one was drawn. Observers on the 
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other hand decide on the magnitude of punishment they would like to impose on a perpetrator. But 
punishment comes with no monetary reward for observers. Instead, observers could be motivated by a 
desire to express their negative emotions towards looting of the charity box or might try to enforce the 
social norm that one does not grab charity money to enrich oneself. The purpose of observers’ 
punishment could be to deter perpetrators from picking urn A in future periods and instead encourage 
them to opt for the lower probability of looting by picking urn B. Observers might potentially obtain 
the role of a moral authority which is in charge of preventing perpetrators from looting the charity box. 
We hypothesize that lower returns resulting from observers’ punishment will discourage perpetrators 
from picking urn A. This means that we expect punishment to successfully deter perpetrators from 
looting with high probability (H1). 
 
Hypothesis 1 (P behavior): Perpetrators choose urn A less often after experiencing 
punishment. 
 
When observers engage in altruistic punishment, their punishment decision can be based on two 
observable variables: the draw of the ball and the history. When analyzing observers’ punishment we 
can therefore differentiate between two types of punishment, which we label outcome-based and 
virtue-based. Outcome-based punishment takes place when observers base their punishment on the 
draw of the ball. In this case punishment will be higher if a red ball is drawn. Additional to punishing 
just the draw of the current ball, observers may look at the history in order to assess a perpetrator’s 
intentions. Encountering an unfavorable history with a high amount of red balls signals repeated 
misconduct in the past and hints at the intention to loot the charity box for personal gain. If 
punishment takes a perpetrator’s history into account we call this kind of punishment virtue-based. We 
expect observers to not only punish the draw of a red ball (outcome) but as well punish the number of 
red balls in the history (virtue). We thus hypothesize that we will observe a positive correlation 
between the number of red balls in a perpetrator’s history and punishment (H2). 
 
Hypothesis 2 (O behavior): Punishment increases with the number of red balls in the observed 
history. 
 
When observers are presented the two observable variables, we expect them to form rational 
expectations about a perpetrator’s choice of urn and therefore his intentions. From the current draw of 
the ball and the history observers will try to infer what urn a perpetrator has picked in the current 
period. Beliefs about the choice of the urn will then determine the punishment. The belief that urn A 
was picked goes along with the belief about this perpetrator’s intentions to loot the charity box. We 
expect observers to punish such an intention more severely compared to the belief that urn B was 
picked and the intention to not loot the box. Therefore, if observers believe that urn A was picked a 
higher punishment is to be expected compared to the belief that urn B was picked (H3). 
 
Hypothesis 3 (O behavior): Punishment increases with the belief that urn A was picked. 
 
For perpetrators, manipulation makes it possible to decrease the number of red balls that is shown in 
their history. From (H2) it follows that a lower number of red balls will result in less punishment. Less 
punishment in turn increases a perpetrator’s payoff. Therefore, by manipulating his history a 
perpetrator is able to generate a positive return. But as manipulation is costly to the perpetrator, the 
question arises if the returns generated by manipulation outbalance the required costs to change a 
signal. We hypothesize that perpetrators engage in impression management because by doing so they 
are able to make a profit (H4). 
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Hypothesis 4 (Impression Management): Manipulation increases perpetrators’ profits. 
 
Furthermore, we expect (H4) to be reflected in perpetrators’ beliefs as well. When engaging in 
manipulation, perpetrators do so because they expect a signal change to reduce the punishment they 
receive. This reduction of punishment occurs because a more favorable history is punished less by 
observers as stated in (H2). We expect perpetrators to engage in manipulation because they believe 
this will lead to lower punishment (H5). 
 
Hypothesis 5 (P behavior): Expected punishment decreases in response to manipulated signals. 
 
Additionally, we conjecture that when manipulation is possible in the high cost and low cost 
treatment, signal change offers a substitute to switching from the bad urn to the good one. Instead of 
switching urns, perpetrators are now offered the possibility to maintain their initial selection of the urn 
and simultaneously build a more favorable history. Manipulation makes it possible to modify the 
history without changing the choice of urn. We assume that after experiencing punishment 
perpetrators react to the possibility of manipulation by substituting a switch of urns (as H1 stated) with 
a signal change (H6)  
 
Hypothesis 6 (P behavior): Perpetrators increase manipulation after experiencing punishment, 
if manipulation is possible. 
 
Our last hypothesis looks at the causes for impression management. Perpetrators will manipulate their 
histories to paint a more favorable picture of their past behavior. Similar to Zhong and Liljenquist 
(2006), where moral purity was achieved by washing one’s hands, we argue that perpetrators are 
driven by a similar desire in our experiment. Perpetrators who engage in manipulation try to establish 
a clean image of themselves. In doing so, the manipulation of a red ball offers decreasing benefits 
depending on the number of red balls already present in the history. If a history shows 5 white balls, 
the manipulation of the first red ball offers the highest benefit, as this manipulation makes the 
difference between a complete clean history and a history with a red ball. These marginal benefits of 
manipulation decrease, as the number of red balls increases. A perpetrator whose history already 
shows five red balls, gains relatively little by manipulating the fifth red ball and changing his history 
into showing 4 red balls and 1 white ball instead. This logic implies that manipulating a signal is more 
beneficial if the actual history is closer to a clean image (H7). This idea is also described by Wilhelm 
Busch’s wise maxim "Once your worldly reputation is in tatters, the opinion of others hardly 
matters". 
 
Hypothesis 7 (P behavior): Manipulation decreases as the number of red balls in the history 
increases. 
5. Results on the Low Returns to Impression Management 
Table 1 shows descriptive results for the three treatments over 35 periods and all perpetrators. Periods 
1-5 are excluded, since these periods are required to build up the initial history first. In baseline, urn A 
(where the probability of looting was 80%) was chosen in 72% of cases. The frequency of red balls 
amounted to 0.63 and the average history displayed 3.13 red balls. We evaluate the five period history 
by adding up all red balls in an individual history. We assume that the relative position of a red ball 
within the history makes no difference and therefore process data on the total number of red balls only. 
A history can have values ranging from 0 (five white balls) to 5 (five red balls). When we introduce 
manipulation at high costs, urn A was picked in 66% of cases which lead to a frequency of red balls of 
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0.60. In the low cost treatment the choice of urn A increased to 79% and with it the frequency of red 
balls to 0.66. Perpetrators manipulated a considerable amount of signals. Out of all red balls drawn, 
nearly every 5th red ball (0.18) was manipulated to show a white ball in high cost. In low cost, 
manipulation increased to 25% which means that every 4th red ball was manipulated on average. The 
frequencies of red balls drawn as well as the manipulation of balls resulted in an average history of 
2.37 red balls in high cost and 2.46 in low cost. For our analysis we restrict manipulation of signals to 
those cases where red balls were changed into white balls, reflecting behavior targeted at improving a 
perpetrator’s history28. On average, observers spent 4.00 Taler on punishment in treatment baseline. 
These expenditures decreased to 3.94 Taler in treatment high cost and to 3.53 Taler in treatment low 
cost. 
 
 Baseline High Cost Low Cost 
Urn A 0.72 0.66 0.79 
Frequency of red balls 0.63 0.60 0.66 
Change Signal (over red balls)  0.18 0.25 
5 Signal History 3.13 2.37 2.46 
Observers’ Punishment 4.00 3.94 3.53 
Table 1: Descriptive results for periods 6-40 
 
To assess how perpetrators react to punishment and adjust their choice of urn (H1) we ran a regression 
with choice of urn as the dependent and the aggregate punishment that perpetrators received over the 
last five periods as an independent variable. The aggregate punishment sums up the amount of Taler 
that was spent on punishment during the last five periods for each individual perpetrator. The variable 
ranges from 0 Taler to 100 Taler. Since history has a five period timeframe by design, we decided to 
use that same interval for punishment received as well
29
. Furthermore we add the ball and the history 
from the previous period as controls in the regression since both variables influence the choice of urn 
in the actual period. The dummy variable red ball in previous period indicates if a red ball was drawn 
in the previous period. History denotes the number of red balls that are present in a perpetrator’s 
history before he makes his choice of urn in the current period. Perpetrators might follow simple 
heuristics regarding the number of red balls in their history and react to deviations from that heuristic 
by adjusting their choice of urn accordingly. By controlling for ball and history we account for 
perpetrators’ different strategies when picking an urn30. Furthermore, the choice between urn A and 
urn B could be either driven by a perpetrator’s type, e.g. someone who favors looting versus someone 
who favors altruism, or by the reaction to experimental incentives, e.g. the punishment received, the 
desire to build up a certain history or the success of looting in past periods. To separate these two 
influences, we take a perpetrator’s choice of urn in the very first period and include it as a dummy 
variable (urn A in period 1). This variable serves as a proxy for his type. In the regression models (2), 
(4) and (6) we carry out additional robustness checks by including the variables female and period. 
 
                                                     
28
 Opposite behavior existed, i.e. changing a white ball into a red one, but those cases were rare and did not offer 
enough data for analysis. In total, we find 9 such observations for periods 6-40 (3 in treatment high cost and 6 in 
treatment low cost). Quite possibly, these changes could be due to players who wanted to just check out what 
happens after such a change or players simply making mistakes. When analyzing signal changes we exclude all 
these observations and focus on manipulation from red balls to white balls only. 
29
 It may be possible that perpetrators are more short-sighted and react only to the last punishment received. We 
checked for that possibility by repeating the regression with punishment from the previous period instead of the 
five-period aggregate. The results remain robust for that change. 
30
 Including 1-period lagged variables as controls limits observations for choice of urn to the periods 7-40. This 
results in 680 observations. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Urn A Baseline Baseline High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
       
Sum of Punishment/100 -2.01** -1.97** 0.89 0.83 -0.02 -0.20 
 (0.89) (0.94) (1.31) (1.23) (1.22) (1.12) 
Red ball in previous 
period 
0.47 0.41 0.50 0.44 0.56* 0.55 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.34) 
History  0.84*** 0.78*** 0.39* 0.32 -0.16 -0.14 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) 
Urn A in period 1 0.97 1.30* 2.55*** 2.67*** 4.30*** 4.49*** 
 (0.66) (0.70) (0.49) (0.60) (0.57) (0.55) 
Female  0.59  -0.70  -0.47 
  (0.58)  (0.63)  (0.60) 
Period  -0.00  0.02  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Constant -2.18*** -2.39** -1.31* -1.06 -1.43*** -1.56** 
 (0.82) (0.99) (0.76) (0.99) (0.51) (0.66) 
       
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.47 
Logit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2: Perpetrators’ choice of urn 
Table 2 shows the regression results. Since we find that the coefficients of sum of punishment are quite 
small, we calibrated this variable relative to the maximum value of 100. This means that the maximum 
punishment of 100 Taler over five periods obtains the value 1. Consequently, coefficients are now 
100-times as big as the original coefficients for the variable sum of punishment. 
We see that in baseline the sum of punishments received over the last five periods has a significant 
negative effect on the choice of urn (model (1)). But this effect disappears when manipulation is 
possible (model (3)-(6)). This indicates that altruistic punishment is indeed successful in reducing 
looting in treatment baseline. When evaluating marginal effects of the regression we see that the 
probability of choosing urn A without any prior punishment (when sum of punishment is equal to 0) is 
82%
31
. Every additional 10 Taler of punishment during the last five periods decrease that probability 
by about 4.4%. The highest possible punishment of 100 Taler over five periods results in a probability 
for picking urn A of only 38%. While increased punishment reduces the probability of choosing urn A 
considerably in treatment baseline, this is not observed in the manipulation treatments. In treatment 
high cost, the probability of picking urn A even increases from 74% without any punishment received 
to 87% with the highest possible punishment. In treatment low cost the probability of picking urn A 
does not change with punishment (88%). Therefore we state as the first result: 
Result 1 (P behavior): In baseline, punishment deters perpetrators from picking urn A. In both 
manipulation treatments, punishment fails to influence the choice of urn. 
To answer hypothesis 2, we look at observers’ punishment behavior. To assess how observers engage 
in altruistic punishment, we run a regression with realized punishment as the dependent variable 
                                                     
31
 Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of every other control variable. 
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controlling for the ball drawn and the history, because observers base their punishment decision on 
these two variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Punishment Baseline Baseline High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
       
Red ball 4.48*** 4.46*** 3.65*** 3.69*** 4.26*** 4.31*** 
 (1.28) (1.29) (1.01) (1.00) (1.43) (1.44) 
History 0.60* 0.56* 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.28 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) 
Period  0.00  -0.02  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Female  -1.15  -0.72  -1.55 
  (1.90)  (1.56)  (2.96) 
Constant -0.73 -0.13 1.54** 2.53** 0.04 1.47 
 (0.92) (1.53) (0.60) (1.16) (0.72) (2.55) 
       
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 
Linear regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Observers’ Punishment 
As no surprise, observers’ punishment increases significantly if a red ball was drawn. In baseline this 
markup amounts to 4.5 Taler, reducing a perpetrator’s payoff by 22.5 Taler, since 1 Taler spent by 
observers resulted in a payoff reduction of 5 Taler. While red ball is highly significant across all 
treatments, history is significant in baseline only (p=0.06). This indicates observers’ willingness to 
take the signal history into account but only if they know the history to be free from manipulation. As 
soon as manipulation is possible, observers recognize the possibly flawed type of information the 
history provides and condition their punishment on the draw of the ball alone. 
To corroborate this result we looked at observers at an individual level to learn what strategies they 
chose in order to decide for their level of punishment. While some observers may have a more narrow 
focus on the ball drawn, others may prioritize the history. In order to assess how observers differ in 
their punishment strategies, we ran individual regressions on the player level, checking if ball or 
history or both have a significant influence on punishment. For every observer we regress punishment 
as the dependent variable on ball and history as independent variables. We allocate observers to the 
two groups outcome-based and virtue-based punishment, which were described previously in chapter 
4. A perpetrator is allocated to outcome-based punishment if only ball has a significant (p<0.1) and 
positive coefficient in the regression, but history has not. This group includes all observers who put 
their focus on punishing the outcome, i.e. if looting took place or not, without having the history 
influencing their decision. Virtue-based punishment on the other hand reacts to history. Observers in 
this group are responsive to history by increasing their punishment the more red balls the history 
presents. When we observe a positive and significant (p<0.1) coefficient for history, while the 
coefficient for ball may or may not be significant at the same time, we allocate an individual to this 
group. All individuals who do not match one of these two groups are either disengaged, meaning they 
do not punish at all, or cannot be matched to one of the two above groups because coefficients fail to 
meet the required criteria. We allocate those individuals to the group others. Figure 1 shows 
percentages of these groups over our three treatments. 
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Figure 1: Outcome- and virtue-based punishment 
In each treatment, we can assign roughly 50% of observers to either the outcome-based or virtue-based 
punishment group. Between these two groups, observers follow a virtue-based punishment approach 
more often in baseline, compared to high cost and low cost. In the manipulation treatments, outcome-
based punishment is more frequently executed. This change of distribution between treatments 
supplies additional evidence on hypothesis 2: in baseline more observers take the history into account 
compared to the manipulation treatments. As costs for manipulation decrease and the history becomes 
more noisy, observers progress towards outcome-based punishment as a favorable strategy. 
 
Result 2 (O behavior): In baseline, punishment increases by 0.6 Taler for every additional red 
ball in the history. In the manipulation treatments, additional red balls in the history do not 
increase punishment. 
 
As result 2 shows, in the manipulation treatments observers do not react to additional red balls in the 
history by increasing punishment. This indicates that observers recognize the possibility of 
manipulation and react to that by not looking at the manipulated history when engaging in punishment. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that observers do not want to punish perpetrators for their 
intentions to loot the charity box. In (H3) we hypothesized that punishment increases with the belief 
that urn A was picked. While in baseline the history offered an unadulterated picture of past draws and 
therefore was a valid proxy for actual intentions, with manipulation observers need to rely more on 
their formed beliefs about a perpetrator’s intentions. For hypothesis 3, we look at observers’ beliefs 
about the perpetrator’s choice of urn. After having implemented the punishment decision, observers 
were asked to state their beliefs about the perpetrator’s choice of urn. We constructed this question in 
such a way that the current draw of the ball did not influence observers’ beliefs, but only the observed 
history (for details see section Experimental Design). Therefore, history significantly influences 
expected urn A in all treatments
32
. Because of this we substitute history with expected urn A in the 
regression from Table 3 to take a look at how beliefs influence the punishment decision. 
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 Coefficients for a logit regression are 0.61 (p<0.01) in baseline, 0.34 (p<0.01) in high cost and 0.56 (p<0.01) 
in low cost 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Punishment Baseline Baseline High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
       
Red ball 4.68*** 4.64*** 3.54*** 3.60*** 4.13*** 4.17*** 
 (1.24) (1.25) (1.02) (1.00) (1.38) (1.39) 
Expected urn A 1.87 1.87 1.12 1.16 2.72** 2.81** 
 (1.18) (1.18) (0.82) (0.83) (1.16) (1.16) 
Period  0.00  -0.03  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Female  -1.27  -0.75  -1.79 
  (1.92)  (1.57)  (2.90) 
Constant -0.19 0.34 1.18** 2.23* -0.75 0.75 
 (0.91) (1.43) (0.52) (1.09) (0.59) (2.52) 
       
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.16 
Linear regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Observers’ Punishment controlling for expectations about chosen urn 
We observe that expected urn A obtains positive coefficients for all treatments, and even a  
significantly positive one in treatment low cost. This indicates that when manipulation is cheap, 
observers do no longer rely on the history in order to deduce a perpetrator’s intentions but instead rely 
on their beliefs about the choice of urn. In treatment baseline the un-manipulated history offers 
observers a direct way to punish perpetrators intentions (result 2). But with manipulation observers 
rely less on this observable history, as they acknowledge the possibly flawed nature of this history. 
Instead they form beliefs about a perpetrator’s intentions and make their punishment dependent on 
these beliefs.  
 
Additionally, we ran regressions (not reported here) on whether expected urns were significantly 
affected by the chosen urns, which cannot be observed by the observer. Our results are significant for 
the treatments high cost and low cost
33
. This reveals that perpetrators left traces of their intentions in 
their history, which were correctly interpreted by observers. In spite of the possibility of manipulation, 
observers thus formed rational expectations. The unwillingness to make the level of punishment 
dependent on the history is thus not related to a failure to correctly derive intentions from the history. 
Instead, observers may be uncertain about the quality of a manipulated signal and prefer to base their 
decision on less uncertain criteria. 
 
Result 3 (O behavior): In treatment low cost, punishment increases significantly with the belief 
that urn A was picked. With manipulation, instead of punishing based on history, observers 
punish based on their beliefs about perpetrator’s choice of urn. 
 
As we have shown, observers’ punishment increases with the history in the baseline treatment (Result 
2). Based on this observation it seems possible that by manipulating a history into showing less red 
balls, perpetrators are able to generate positive returns in the form of reduced punishments in the 
manipulation treatments. Next, we want to address the question if these returns outbalance the required 
costs for the signal change. By answering this question we are able to determine if impression 
                                                     
33
 Coefficients for a logit regression are 0.41 (p>0.1) in baseline, 0.76 (p<0.05) in high cost and 0.91 (p<0.05) in 
low cost 
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management is a monetary profitable activity. To obtain the gains from manipulation we start by 
calculating the revenue a single signal change generates. After obtaining the revenue from a signal 
change we can compare that value to the costs required and calculate if the resulting change in payoff 
is positive or negative. Our dependent variable for the regression in Table 5 is the revenue obtained in 
one period. Different to the total payoff a perpetrator receives at the end of a period, we generate the 
variable revenue by excluding costs of a signal change. Without these costs we acquire a perpetrator’s 
revenue in each period which includes initial endowment, transfers from the charity box and 
punishment. Revenue ranges from 0 (a white ball was drawn and the perpetrator was punished with 20 
Taler, resulting in a 100 Taler reduction) to 200 (a red ball was drawn and the perpetrator did not 
receive any punishment). Having obtained this value, we can determine what impact a signal change 
has. We need to consider that any changed signal remains in the history for 5 periods. Afterwards it 
drops out, as the history includes the last five signals only. Therefore a signal change in period pt 
affects all revenues from pt+1 to pt+5. Vice versa, the revenue in period pt is influenced by all previous 
signal changes in pt-5 to pt-1. Thus, if we want to analyze how the revenue of any given period is 
influenced by signal changes, we have to ask how many of the last five signals were changed and how 
many were not. To obtain this value, we first calculate a perpetrator’s un-manipulated history (variable 
history w/o change). This value depicts the number of red balls that were actually drawn during the 
last five periods. Secondly, we calculate the number of signal changes that took place during those five 
periods (variable sum of changes). These two variables provide us with the information how a history 
would have looked without any manipulation and how many of the red balls are actually manipulated. 
Lastly, it is important to note that we exclude periods 1-5 and 36-40 from the regression to avoid 
distortions. In periods 1-5 we are unable to calculate history values for all previous 5 periods as these 
are not fully present yet. In the last 5 periods a signal change affects less than 5 future periods, as the 
experiment ends after period 40. Table 5 presents the results including the two above described 
variables as controls. Additionally we include the dummy variable urn A in the regression to control 
for a perpetrator’s choice of urn in each period34. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Revenue High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
     
Urn A 54.29*** 54.39*** 56.00*** 56.01*** 
 (3.65) (3.64) (5.40) (5.44) 
History w/o change -0.13 -0.53 -0.60 -0.61 
 (1.60) (1.53) (1.42) (1.44) 
Sum of changes 0.45 0.80 0.50 0.50 
 (1.63) (1.44) (1.52) (1.52) 
Period  0.31  -0.01 
  (0.19)  (0.18) 
Constant 104.2*** 98.82*** 104.5*** 104.7*** 
 (3.43) (5.00) (4.63) (6.22) 
     
Observations 600 600 600 600 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.22 
Linear regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Revenue from impression management 
                                                     
34
 Additionally controlling for gender would only make sense if observers could react to it. Since gender is not 
revealed in the experiment and it seems implausible that observers implicitly gain clues about perpetrators' 
gender and react to that, we dropped gender from the regression. 
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In order to make a profit by manipulating a signal, the revenue from that manipulation would have to 
outbalance the costs. In treatment high (low) cost the costs for changing one signal were 20 (10) Taler 
and an increase in revenue would have to compensate this value for manipulation to be profitable. We 
have to remember that a manipulated signal remains in the history for five periods and influences 
revenue in each period. Changing a signal therefore does not need to compensate for 20 (10) Taler in 
an individual period. In order for manipulation to be profitable it is sufficient for a signal change to 
increase revenue by a fifth of the total costs in any single period. This means that a signal change 
would need to increase revenue in a single period by 4 Taler in treatment high cost and 2 Taler in 
treatment low cost. We conduct a Wald-Test to identify if the coefficients of sum of changes in Table  
5 are significantly different from these values. In treatment high cost 0.45 is significantly smaller than 
4 (p=0.04), in treatment low cost we cannot identify a significant difference between the necessary 
revenue of 2 and the coefficient of 0.50 (p=0.34). Based on these results we can state that impression 
management offers only a low profitability in monetary terms. In treatment low costs, evidence for 
profits is weak, whereas in treatment high cost we even find evidence that impression management 
results in losses. This is summarized in result 4: 
 
Result 4 (Impression Management): Impression management is not profitable. In treatment 
high cost perpetrators even incur losses by engaging in the manipulation of signals.  
6. Results for Moral Cleansing 
Result 4 illustrates the low profitability of impression management. There are two reasons that could 
explain this finding. First, perpetrators could be subject to erroneous beliefs about the profits from 
impression management. If this would be the case perpetrators would engage in impression 
management because they (wrongly) expected a high profitability. A second possibility is that 
perpetrators form correct expectations about the low profits from impression management but still 
engage in manipulation. In this case the motivation for impression management is not monetary profit, 
but other, intrinsic motives. To identify which of these two possibilities holds true, we ran a regression 
with perpetrators’ expected punishment (Table 6). We include the ball and the history in the regression 
as controls, as these are the two variables determining punishment and subsequently expectations 
about punishment. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expected 
punishment 
Baseline Baseline High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
       
Urn A 0.33 0.28 -1.34* -1.44** -1.53 -1.85** 
 (0.99) (0.98) (0.78) (0.65) (0.95) (0.80) 
Red ball 4.65*** 4.84*** 5.98*** 6.02*** 4.49*** 4.50*** 
 (1.06) (1.11) (1.15) (1.27) (0.87) (0.86) 
History w/o change 0.13 0.33 -0.15 -0.15 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.49) (0.52) (0.30) (0.29) (0.41) (0.39) 
Sum of changes   0.97 0.98* -0.28 -0.07 
   (0.57) (0.54) (0.46) (0.47) 
Female  -2.44  -0.39  1.54 
  (2.25)  (1.94)  (1.21) 
Period  -0.08**  0.01  0.06* 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant 1.80 3.93*** 0.95 1.15 1.67 -0.22 
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 (1.19) (1.00) (0.69) (1.96) (1.09) (1.37) 
       
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.12 
Linear regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Perpetrators’ expected punishment 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient of red ball is highly significant in all treatments. Comparing the 
coefficients here with those for actual punishment in Table 3, we observe that perpetrators’ 
expectations match actual punishment rather well. In baseline as well as low cost, the draw of a red 
ball is expected to increase punishment by 4.65 Taler and 4.49 Taler respectively (models (1) and (5)). 
Observers actually increase punishment by 4.48 in treatment baseline and 4.26 Taler in treatment low 
cost (see Table 3). In treatment high cost perpetrators expect to be punished more harshly for a red ball 
(5.98 Taler, model (3)), whereas observers’ punishment is only 3.65 Taler (Table 3, model (3)). While 
expectations about the punishment of a red ball are quite close to the actual values, expectations for 
history are not. All coefficients for history w/o change fail to be significantly different from 0. In 
baseline (models (1) and (2)), the coefficients of 0.13 and 0.33 at least display the correct positive 
impact of actual punishment on signal change because actual punishment increased by 0.60 Taler for 
each additional red ball in history (Table 3). In the manipulation treatments however, coefficients turn 
negative (models (3), (4) and (6)). This indicates that as a history gets more and more unfavorable by 
additional red balls, perpetrators expect even less punishment. 
 
Furthermore, for the variable sum of changes we would expect negative coefficients that indicate a 
decrease of expected punishment after changing signals. This follows from (H2), were we stated that a 
lower number of red balls in the history leads to less punishment. Thus, when changing a red ball into 
a white ball and thereby reducing the number of red balls in the history we would expect that 
perpetrators subsequently expect lower punishment. Yet, results reveal that this is not the case. In high 
cost, we observe a significant positive coefficient (0.98) in model (4). This means, that perpetrators 
expect their punishment to increase by nearly 1 Taler for every signal they manipulated in the last five 
periods. This observation runs contrary to the assumption that signals are manipulated for monetary 
reasons, as assumed in (H4). The regression presented here (Table 6) provides no evidence that 
perpetrators expect their punishment to decrease as a result from changing signals. 
 
Result 5 (P behavior): Perpetrators do not expect a lower punishment after changing signals. 
 
If we combine the results from Table 5 and Table 6 we see that perpetrators do not profit from 
impression management in monetary terms and do not even expect to receive less punishment after 
manipulating signals. Therefore, we conclude that perpetrators who manipulate are driven by an 
intrinsic motivation. Manipulation is not implemented to influence observers into punishing less but 
rather because manipulation offers a way to paint a favorable picture of oneself. This behavior can be 
considered as a manifestation of moral cleansing (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006, Sachdeva et al. 2009, 
Brañas-Garza et. al 2011). Looting a charity box imposes a moral burden on perpetrators because this 
is considered as a transgression. Changing signals and building a positive history seems to provide 
perpetrators with a mechanism to reduce this moral burden. 
 
Having identified the reasons for impression management, we want to look into when and why 
perpetrators change their signals in more detail. Table 7 shows the results. Here, we ask how 
perpetrators’ probability of changing signals is influenced by punishment. Result 1 has shown that in 
59 
the baseline treatment perpetrators react to punishment by looting less often (i.e. picking urn B more 
often). In the manipulation treatments this effect was not visible. Since manipulation is possible there, 
it may offer perpetrators an alternative to switching urns. Instead of changing their choice of urn, 
perpetrators can now change the ball through manipulation. Thus, manipulation could be a substitute 
to choice of urn.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Signal change High Cost High Cost Low Cost Low Cost 
     
Sum of punishment/100 2.46** 2.51** 1.39 1.00 
 (1.03) (1.02) (1.25) (1.31) 
Urn A 0.85 1.02 0.19 0.18 
 (0.82) (0.81) (0.75) (0.72) 
history -0.57*** -0.55** -0.86*** -0.79*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.22) 
urn A in period 1 -0.86 -0.99** 0.66 0.69 
 (0.56) (0.48) (0.58) (0.69) 
female  0.59  -0.53 
  (0.69)  (0.40) 
period  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant -1.13 -1.47 -0.08 0.30 
 (0.85) (0.95) (0.79) (0.85) 
     
Observations
35
 418 418 463 463 
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
Logit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7: Perpetrators’ Change of Signal 
Coefficients for sum of punishment are positive in both treatments, yet only significant in treatment 
high cost (p=0.02 in model (1), p=0.01 in model (2))
36
. These positive coefficients indicate that for an 
increase in punishment an increase in the probability of a signal change is observed as well. Analyzing 
marginal effects of the logit regression reveals that additional 10 Taler of punishment increase the 
probability of a signal change by roughly 4% in treatment high cost and 3% in treatment low cost. For 
example, in treatment high cost, the probability to change a signal is 8% without any prior punishment 
but increases to about 52% with the maximum punishment of 100 Taler. In treatment low cost the 
probabilities are 16% without punishment and 44% with maximum punishment. 
As a result, we can state that the reaction to punishment exhibits different characteristics. Misconduct 
(picking urn A) can be reduced through punishment in the baseline treatment, where no manipulation 
is possible (result 1). When manipulation is possible on the other hand, punishment does not move 
perpetrators towards better conduct. Perpetrators rather increase manipulation instead (H6). This 
shows that good conduct (picking urn B) and changing signals are indeed substitutes. Yet, this result 
has to be interpreted cautiously, as it is not robust for both treatments. 
 
                                                     
35
 Observations include red balls only. 
36
 Again, we calibrate sum of punishment relative to the maximum value of 100, as coefficients are otherwise 
very small. The variable used in the regression obtains values from 0 to 1. 
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Result 6 (P behavior): The probability of changing a signal increases with punishment. In 
treatment high (low) cost every 10 Taler of punishment increase the probability of changing a 
signal by about 4% (3%). 
 
Additionally to perpetrators’ signal change as a reaction to punishment, Table 7 identifies how 
perpetrators’ change their signals dependent on their current history. The negative coefficients for 
history (-0.57 in model (1), -0.86 in model (2)) indicate that perpetrators change less signals as a 
history includes more red balls. This effect is strongly significant over both treatments. This means 
that as a history accumulates more red balls, perpetrators are less likely to change their signals. 
Evaluating marginal effects for history at the means of all other control variables shows that when the 
history shows white balls only, the probability of changing a signal is 42.15% in treatment high cost. 
With five red balls on the other hand, the probability is only 0.40%. In treatment low costs, the 
probability drops from 72.73% with five white balls to 0.35% with 5 red balls. This shows that 
perpetrators tend to manipulate signals in situations where a favorable history is threatened by an 
additional red ball. As a history contains more and more red balls, the propensity to change one 
additional red ball on top of all the others decreases. As (H7) stated, this reflects behavior of feeling 
free to loot, once additional evidence of looting does no longer deteriorate the history. 
Result 7 (P behavior): Manipulation is highest for the first red ball that would enter the history 
and decreases with any additional red ball. 
In summary, our results show how and why perpetrators engage in impression management and how 
observers react to the possibility of manipulation. Without the possibility of manipulation our results 
indicate that punishment reduces looting (result 1) and that an unfavorable history gets punished more 
severely (result 2). With manipulation on the other hand, we see observers no longer reacting to 
perpetrators’ histories in their punishment decision. Observers seem to fully understand the 
consequence of manipulated signals and in turn no longer react to the history itself. Rather, observers 
form beliefs about perpetrators’ intentions and base their punishment decision on these beliefs (result 
3). This behavior is rational as the information provided by the history loses its value, the cheaper 
manipulation is. Interestingly, we find that perpetrators gain relatively little by manipulating signals in 
monetary terms (result 4). In treatment high cost, impression management even results in monetary 
losses. Still, perpetrators continue to engage in this activity. We argue that moral cleansing is the 
reason for this behavior, as perpetrators correctly anticipate to not receive a more lenient punishment 
after manipulation (result 5). The reason for impression management seems to be intrinsically 
motivated by the desire to simply have a good-looking history. Perpetrators thus continue to behave 
badly but substitute their change of behavior with engagement in impression management (result 6). 
Furthermore, those whose history shows no red balls are the ones who engage in impression 
management the most. For perpetrators with very unfavorable histories, little impression management 
is observed (result 7). 
7. Conclusions 
Our experiment showed how experimental subjects looted a charity box and how observers were 
willing to altruistically punish such behavior. We observed that looters were willing to pay for a clean 
history but did not expect a subsequent reduction in punishment. This expectation was in line with 
realized punishments, which also were not reduced for looters with favorable signals. A contrasting 
finding was obtained in a baseline treatment. Punishment was responsive to history if signals could not 
be manipulated. Observers were thus seen to care about the intentions and virtue of looters. Our 
findings reveal that a history that can be costly manipulated fails to be taken seriously by observers. 
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Still, looters continued to allocate money for manipulating signals. We thus conclude that a clean 
record is cultivated for its own sake. 
 
These results provide a cautious warning for activities that relate to impression management. While it 
might seem profitable to take up an opportunity to manipulate signals and generate a more favorable 
image of oneself, the advantages of impression management are observed to be minor in our 
experiment. If the record of past behavior can be manipulated, our results suggest that observers are 
not fooled by such manipulation. Observers correctly identified the possibilities of impression 
management and in turn disregarded information that was easily and cheaply manipulated. And even 
without such information, observers discovered perpetrators’ true intentions remarkably well. Efforts 
to disguise the underlying intentions through impression management failed in our experiment. This 
implies that expenditures on impression management are probably ill spent. 
Our findings are largely restricted to experimental subjects and conclusions with respect to real world 
impression management are notoriously difficult. External validity is thus problematic. However, the 
speed with which experimental subjects discounted signals provides a warning towards arguments on 
the profitability of impression management. Given that a clean record was not even expected to reduce 
punishment, our study hints at an alternative motivation to the favorable impression. Companies, just 
as our experimental subjects, might equally expect little financial return to their social and 
environmental engagement. They might be motivated intrinsically instead, seeking to portray 
themselves in a more favorable light and be seen as such by others.  
One potential conclusion from our findings would be that resources spent for impression management 
violate shareholders’ interests. Widespread claims that improved impressions are profitable in the long 
run do not find support in our experiment. The intrinsic desire to dress up one’s self-image is the 
actual driving force behind impression management. The costs of impression management might also 
be seen as a non-monetary benefit. Just as some jobs besmirch workers physically, others do so 
mentally. Shareholders may allow managers and corporate staff to dedicate resources to impression 
management not because it increases profits but because it serves the desire of moral cleansing. 
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Appendix 
General Instructions (both players) 
Welcome to our experiment and thank you for participating. This experiment consists of 40 periods, 
which are identical. You will be randomly assigned either the role of "Player 1" or the role of "Player 
2". 
The role that was assigned to you is: Player 1 (Player 2). 
In each period you will interact with another Player 2 (Player 1). You will be matched randomly by 
the computer at the start of every period. 
There are 1000 Taler in a charity box at the start of every period. This amount may be reduced 
depending on the players’ behavior. The amount that remains in the charity box at the end of a period 
will be converted into Euros and donated fully to Doctors without Borders if this period gets randomly 
selected at the end of the experiment. Possible donations are between 0 and 1000 Taler. Negative 
amounts are not possible. The charity box is located outside of this laboratory. After you have received 
your payoff, please feel free to take a look at the charity box and the additional information brochures 
about Doctors without Borders. 
At the end of the experiment, out of all 40 periods one period will be randomly selected. This period 
will determine the payoffs for all participants and the amount of money that remains in the charity 
box. All Taler that you earned in the selected period will be converted into Euros (100 Taler = 7€) and 
paid to you outside of the laboratory. Periods that are not selected do not influence your payoff. 
Instructions for Player 1 (Perpetrator) 
At the start of each period you receive 100 Taler. Player 2 receives 150 Taler. 
You decide between urn A and urn B. There are 4 red balls and 1 white ball in urn A and 4 white balls 
and 1 red ball in urn B. After having selected an urn, one ball will be drawn at random. If a red ball 
was drawn, 100 Taler will be transferred from the charity box to you. If a white ball was drawn, no 
Taler will be transferred. 
You and player 2 will observe the ball that was drawn and if 100 Taler were transferred to you or not. 
But player 2 will not be told which urn you picked. If a red ball was drawn, this could therefore either 
result from you picking urn A or urn B. The same is true if a white ball was drawn. 
Urn A Urn B 
  
After a ball was drawn, player 2 can reduce your payoff. Every Taler player 2 spends reduces your 
payoff by 5 Taler. Player 2 can spend up to 20 Taler and reduce your payoff by 100 Taler at a 
maximum. 
Additional to the ball drawn, player 2 will receive information about your last 5 signals. The last 5 
balls drawn will be stored and displayed in a table as shown below. These are your signals. There will 
be either a red or a white ball in each cell. 
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
     
You will observe by how many Taler your payoff got reduced. Afterwards a new period begins and 
you will be randomly matched with another player 2. 
Additional Instructions for treatment High Cost (Low Cost) 
After observing the reduction of your payoff you can change your signal (red ball or white ball) from 
the current period. If a red ball was drawn and you change this signal, instead of this red ball a white 
ball will be stored in the table for the next five periods. If a white ball was drawn and you change this 
signal, a red ball will be stored instead. Changing your signal does not change the amount of money 
transferred from the charity box to you, instead only a different signal will be stored in the table. 
Changing a signal costs 20 (10) Taler. 
After having changed your signal, this new table will be displayed to the randomly selected player 2 in 
the next period. All players know that changing a signal is possible and that it costs 20 (10) Taler. 
Instructions for Player 2 (Observer) 
At the start of each period you receive 150 Taler. Player 1, who is randomly selected, receives 100 
Taler. 
Player 1 decides between urn A and urn B. There are 4 red balls and 1 white ball in Urn A and 4 white 
balls and 1 red ball in urn B. After having selected an urn, one ball will be drawn at random. If a red 
ball was drawn, 100 Taler will be transferred from the charity box to player 1. If a white ball was 
drawn, no Taler will be transferred to player 1. 
You will observe what ball was drawn and if money was transferred to player 1 or not. But you will 
not be told what urn player 1 picked. If a red ball was drawn this could either result from player 1 
picking urn A or urn B. The same is true for a white ball. 
Urn A Urn B 
  
After a ball was drawn and you observe if money was transferred or not, you can reduce player 1’s 
payoff. Every Taler you spend reduces the payoff of player 1 by 5 Taler. You can spend up to 20 Taler 
and reduce the payoff by 100 Taler at a maximum. 
Additional to the ball drawn, you will receive information about player 1’s last 5 signals. The last 5 
balls drawn will be stored and displayed in a table as shown below. These are the signals from player 
1. There will be either a red or a white ball in each cell. 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
     
After you have decided for the reduction of player 1’s payoff a new period starts and you will be 
randomly matched with another player 1. 
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Additional Instructions for treatment High Cost (Low Cost) 
After you reduced player 1’s payoff he can change his signal (red ball or white ball) from the current 
period. If a red ball was drawn and he changes this signal, instead of this red ball a white ball will be 
stored in the table for the next five periods. If a white ball was drawn and he changes this signal, a red 
ball will be stored instead. Changing a signal does not change the amount of money transferred from 
the charity box to player 1, instead only a different signal will be stored in the table. 
Changing a signal costs player 1 20 (10) Taler. 
After having changed the signal, the new table will be displayed to the randomly selected player 2 in 
the next period. All players know that changing a signal is possible and that it costs 20 (10) Taler. 
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